Presentism, Relativity, and Simultaneity

Abstract

The A-theory of time insists that there is some real ontological fact about what is present. It is often alleged that this theory is inconsistent with the theory of special relativity. The conflict originates with the radar definition of simultaneity (RDS in my paper). I argue that the only argument for RDS is the argument for the dispensability of absolute rest; there is no good reason to accept the Newtonian concept of absolute rest and we can do perfectly well without it. I argue that there may be reasons to accept absolute rest. The notion seems to play an important part in our understanding of certain possible worlds. I go on to argue that it isn’t at all clear that the B-theory of time is consistent with special relativity. It accepts the empirically unverifiable entity called minkowsky spacetime. It is thus ostensibly committed to there being facts that go beyond merely what we can measure with RDS.