PANCASILA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR A MORAL GRAMMAR

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ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to clarify the nature of law, specifically the distinction between individuals who implement laws within an existing social system and those who struggle to change the system. In particular, it challenges the possibility of emancipation through social transformation. This paper will suggest that the Indonesian concept of Pancasila – promoted by its former president Soekarno – fulfills this function of morality grounding the validity of laws. It represents the ethical life of the people uniting them into a nation. But it can be extended to international relations as well and serve as validating principles in implementing international laws in economic, social, and political co-operation. This paper will explore Pancasila in connection to the approaches of Habermas and Honneth. It will also contrast this approach with that of Huntington.
INTRODUCTION

One of the leading online news outlets, Republika, presented a report on 30 September 2013 that claimed that Indonesia has 183 disadvantaged regions, 143 of which are conflict-prone areas - many of them in Eastern Indonesia. According to the report, the roots of conflict are economic, socio-cultural, religious, and political. The reporter observed that there is a link between disadvantaged regions and conflict. Conflicts or natural disasters damage the economy and many infrastructure which sets back development. Preventing social conflict requires participation by both local people and international communities. Seminars and workshops need held to seek ways to improve coordination and collaboration between conflict-affected groups, non-governmental organizations, and decision-makers of public administration at all levels.²

We need to educate ourselves on how to deal with social conflicts such as understanding and accepting differences between conflicting parties. Pancasila can be used in dealing with such conflicts on the basis of its guiding principles as a moral grammar for attaining mutual recognition and resolving social conflicts. The aim of this paper is to examine how social conflicts can be resolved based on mutual respect and solidarity. By comparing the theory of the clash of civilizations of Samuel P. Huntington (1927-2008) and Soekarno’s vision on Pancasila as a universal principles of morality we can arrive at a particular grammar for the remaking of the world order after cold world war. Through the use of a phenomenological method, a moral grammar of mutual respect and solidarity can be expected to establish a new paradigm on how global politics can be established to build a new world. It is the idea of “ethical life” that may be used to ground the validity of laws for sustaining integrity within the diversity of cultural identities and political ideologies. Jürgen Habermas (1929-) whose theory of communicative action and Axel Honneth (1949-) whose theory of the struggle of recognition are useful theories for building a new grammar for social relations in modern societies especially when they need to solve social conflict.
Moral Grammar

In general, the term grammar is the set of structural rules governing the composition of clauses, phrases, and words to make sentences that are understood and can be used in communication. The nature of language is to communicate and the function of communication should be to reach understanding. There is therefore a need for both linguistic grammar and communication skills in order to do exchange ideas and come to understand one another. This is all about communicative competence for an effective interaction especially in dealing with social conflict resolutions by conflicting parties themselves.

But communicative competence is only the means by which an effective social interaction can lead to mutual understanding. The ultimate end of social interaction rests in the heart of man as a political animal he/she is seeking the well-being and not just an economic welfare. This is the importance of political philosophical accounts, from the time of Socrates, focusing on the good life of men how to live both as individual and political being in a political community.

One of the collected dialogues is *Crito* in which Socrates shows that the truths of great men speak to us only so far as we have ears and souls to hear them. Genius hears the overtones, and the music of the spheres. Genius knows what Pythagoras meant when he said that philosophy is the highest music. Socrates reminds us that philosophy aids men in choosing the best life as within a political community. Socrates told Crito to do not mind to listen to the teachers of philosophy whether they are good or bad, but think only of philosophy herself. Try to examine her well and truly; and if she be evil, seek to turn away all men from her; but if she be what I believe she is, then follow her and serve her, and be good cheer.

This means the structural components of the state is deduced from the idea of the good on which laws are established. Laws are therefore reflections of morality for the state, the officials, and the people to realize the ultimate end of life which is the well-being. This is what Socrates’s main concern in *Crito* when he asks his friend Crito not to disobey
the laws because it will destroy the laws and the whole state as well.³ Retaliation is a violation to living political communities. Finally Socrates asked Crito not to retain all arguments against the law. It is repeated in Republic that good laws are only necessary means for the state, the people, and the officials to be guided to the end of life. To order a state rightly men’s souls must be raised to behold the universal light so that men can always be just, and only the just men can know what justice is.⁴

In Politics, Aristotle has explained that the state is the highest form of community and aims at the highest good. The structural components of the state constitute villages, households, male and female, master and slave in seeking all the need of men. Therefore the ultimate end of the state is satisfying the good life of men. Political communities are founded on a natural impulse in order to secure a bare subsistence.⁵ Plato discussed ideal state on the principle of the good by which he would promote unity in the strictest sense. This, according to Aristotle, is wrong because it is against natural affection of men. The good citizen may not be a good man. The good citizen is one who does good service to his/her state while this state may be bad in principle. In a constitutional state the good citizen knows both how to rule and how to obey. The good man is one who is fitted to rule. But a citizen in a constitutional state learns to rule by obeying orders. Therefore citizenship in such a state is a moral training.⁶

Hobbes pointed out in Leviathan that when men are in the state of nature, fear and liberty are consistent. But when men are in the state of civility, liberty is not a right of ordinary people because individual liberties are given to the sovereign. Therefore fear of the leviathan would civilize people by restraining their evil inclinations toward one other. To illustrate his argument, Hobbes used the analogy of a ship that would sink if the passengers did not throw their possessions overboard. If possessions were not thrown overboard, the ship would sink and possessions as well as life would be lost.⁷ Hobbes’ view of desirable government contrasts with that of Locke. Locke viewed society on a scale from subjugation to personal freedom and declared personal freedom to be the ideal. Locke stands firmly in social contract theory that there are inalienable rights to
be given to the state. The basic grammar of the rule of law is to guarantee personal freedom. There is therefore the state developed to accomplish personal liberties that men have in the previous stage of living in families and particular communities. Social contract is no less than a rational construction to ground the existence of a political community from what is already experienced.

Rousseau looks at the state as symphony where each part is sustained by all the other parts. But in this symphony a single melody should have primacy over all other musical parameters. The general will is this single melody that allows the state to come into existence. Comparing it with musical clarity also implies that the listener can choose what to hear.\(^8\)

Kant’s understanding of the state was as a *persona civitatis*. For him the state in the hand of the sovereign has the will to command. The will of the state is above the will of citizens because it is the personification of the will of citizens. In connection to his categorical imperative, the expression of the will of the sovereign state corresponds to the goal of the will of citizens. A study of Michael Blome-Tillmann shows that Kant’s doctrine of state sovereignty is an ambiguous foundation for liberal internationalist theory because on the one hand, he suggests that any existing form of sovereignty is adequate to the goal of freedom. On the other, he claims that all existing sovereigns are compelled to undergo self-reform.\(^9\) Kant grounds his political project on a conviction that the public use of reason and open debate will gradually lead us away from an initial preoccupation with anarchy and coercion in creating the space for reflection and increased autonomy. Arendt is correct saying that Kant never truly wrote about political philosophy. This is the reason why in his *Critique of Judgment* one can see how Kant developed a grammar of political philosophy rather than a moral philosophy. His question is about politics and is reflective rather than practical.

If thinking of morality as a purely private matter of the individual’s conscience seems too abstract, the Hegelian criticisms show that moral reflections are empty unless they take account of the social world in which
they can be realized in concrete actions. In reference to inclusive context of *Sittlichkeit* which is the ethical life of the people in which social action can be understood as expression of a moral will taking place in social, political, and historical context.¹⁰

As descendants of the Frankfurt School, Habermas and Honneth try to integrate Kant’s concept of freedom with Hegel’s phenomenological idea of the *Sittlichkeit* in order to shift from a grammar that is neither merely formalist reason nor merely embedded social action. Habermas’ approach to social problems is similar to Durkheim’s sociological theory of solidarity. For him, solidarity expresses a regularity in answering the question concerning how society is possible. This question is put in the context of modern and contemporary societies that seek solidarity neither simply as a form of altruistic action, nor as a derivation of the Catholic ‘ethos of brotherliness’. Using linguistic analysis, Habermas considers solidarity as a frame of shared values and/or rules that keeps society together. The question about how society possibly can be analyzed from a set of shared values and rules institutionalized and available to everyone within the public space.¹¹ This thesis relies on the ideas of mutual respect, solidarity, and generalized interests that coincides largely with Hegel’s idea of *Sittlichkeit* and Kant’s idea of freedom. Solidarity is now considered the moral will of all concerned and it is now accepted as the *inconditionnalité conditionnelle*, unconditioned condition that all informed participants would freely accept. Thinking solidarity along this normative line is not inconsistent with the principle of the social order and social integration where values of a post-conventional identity can be expressed into modern laws.

In an age of bitter “identity politics” and pseudo-claims to “inclusivity” social theorists felt compelled to go back to foundational premises, to start all over again and rebuild a model of society based on reason, shared values, and individual autonomy. Axel Honneth, a social philosopher and Hegelian scholar attempts to construct a model which draws on the early Hegel (of the Jena period). He claims that social theory starts with social conflict resolution. Aside from Nicolo Machiavelli
and Hobbes, social conflict resolution can be explained through Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* where the Spirit develops its social life by means of a series of negations. Especially through “the struggle for recognition.” Honneth explains that human societies evolve from simple to complex, from ascribed or status-based honor to achievement, from an undifferentiated whole to a division of labour, from indifference to the fate of others to a recognition of interdependence, from private interests to shared values, from particularistic norms to universal laws and human rights, from authority based on tradition to a devaluation of tradition itself. As a third generation philosopher of the Frankfurt School, Honneth shows that the end point of the struggle for recognition is modernization without materialism and without *techne*. In this struggle for recognition, the social forms are family, civil society and the state which correspond respectively to love (affective bonds), law and solidarity, while on another level: intuition, cognitive recognition and rational intellectual intuition. The struggle for recognition links them reciprocally towards the final achievement of a “moral grammar” that is reconstruction of modern societies based on love, rights, and solidarity in seeking social integration within cultural diversities.¹²

**The Clash of Civilizations**

Huntington’s book *The Clash of Civilizations* describes the remaking of a global politics after the cold war. Huntington claims that the clash of civilizations occurs when civilized modern societies are not governed by balancing the real conditions concerning dos and don’ts in both private and public domains.¹³ It is because the clash of civilizations is potentially rooted in the way we look at the world from the point of differences.

Huntington has provided us with the three maps about the world divisions in terms of differences. First is the division of the world in 1920s between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’. Second is the division of the world in 1960s by the cold world war into the Free World, the Communist
Bloc, and the Unaligned Nations. Third is the division of the world of civilizations in 1990s into Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Chinese, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese.\textsuperscript{14}

Huntington contends that global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational after the collapse of communist world in 1980s and that the distinctions among peoples are no ideological, political, or economic but cultural. Huntington acknowledges the condition of the clash of civilizations as something serious. The recognition of this condition may actually help us to question: “Who we are? Where are we going? and What will we become?” Of course the question is answered by reference to things that mean most to us such as what religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions do we have?

People use politics not just to advance their interest but also to define their identity. Many conflicts are based on a false definition about our identity that is made only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.\textsuperscript{15} This is because the most important groupings are no longer ideology but cultural preferences. It follows that the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts are conflicts between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. What underlies Huntington theory is therefore a particular grammar for the remaking of world order by balancing multipolar and multicivilizational world by which the shift to a new global politics after the post cold world war is made possible.

Francis Fukuyama’s thesis of the end of history places Western liberal democracy as the end of seeking commonalities of civilizations in dealing with social conflicts. But Huntington makes sure that the main concern of geopolitics is to safeguard peace and international order based on commonalities of civilizations that are still in the making. The question is how do we benefit out of different civilizations? How do we prevent war? What foundation can we make to safeguard world peace and international order? What kind of morality can be developed to include different worldviews in different cultures?
Cultures are relative while morality is absolute. Cultures prescribe institutions and behavior patterns to guide human actions which are right in any society. But morality refers to truth and justice in any given culture. It might be said that human society is universal because it is human. Likewise human society is also particular because it is a society. As at times we march with others, at times we march alone, and yet a thin minimal morality does derive from the common human condition; a universal dispositions which is present in all cultures. This is the pragmatic ethical concern which demands a search for what is common to most civilizations, instead of promoting the supposedly universal features of one civilization. And so the constructive course in a multicivilizational world is to renounce universalism, accept diversity, and seek commonalities.16

**Pancasila**

Before Huntington’s provocative analysis about the new force in global politics, Indonesia’s President Soekarno has delivered a speech before the world delegations, in the United Nations 15th General Assembly on September 30, 1960. It represented a revolutionary understanding of international affairs. Soekarno’s speech was a plea to make peace and justice the UN’s main task. For Soekarno, the UN General Assembly is only the means by which every independent country can be encouraged by this world organization to achieve its full glory.

Soekarno was ahead of Huntington in seeing the problem of international order before and during the cold world war. He believed that this order was politically wrong and culturally lacking in respect. His speech in the UN about the need “to build the world anew” was his attempt to share with the UN a particular grammar on how to make the UN work for international cooperation in seeking the well being of its members. The speech of Soekarno was inspired by Indonesia’s state philosophy – Pancasila – which pointed to mutual respect and solidarity among independent countries joining the UN. The first manifestation of Pancasila for the international cooperation was the Dasasila (ten
principles) formulated as the plea among Asian and African countries in Bandung, Indonesia from 18 to 24 April, 1955. The basic theme in Pancasila was reflected in Dasasila Bandung to ground the new politics of coexistence among Asian and African countries and could possibly be extended to include all independent countries in the UN.

Pancasila consists of two old Javanese-Sanskrit words Panca and Sila. Panca means five and Sila means principle. The five principles are (1) belief in the one and only God, (2) just and civilized humanity, (3) the unity of Indonesia, (4) democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives, and (5) social justice for all of the people of Indonesia. Development of these basic values in Dasasila according to Soekarno can be extended to the UN formulations of universal principles as the particular moral grammar in seeking peace and justice for a new world. The UN General Assembly is tasked to strengthen the very essence of being a nation to its members whose end is to realize the well-being of the people. There is therefore the need for a particular grammar in the renewal of an international order.

Huntington’s claim that culture to be made the core of seeking moral grammar is less comprehensive than Soekarno’s claim about Pancasila which is beyond cultural consciousness. In Pancasila, the task of remaking international relationships involves ideology, culture, religion, politics, economics, and fellowship. Soekarno’s concepts of Pancasila reflect back upon indigenous peasant concepts of gotong royong literally meant the collective bearing of burdens and figuratively meant the piety of all for the interests of all. It is morally universal and culturally rooted in the everyday life-world of the people. It is beyond pragmatic consideration of ideological and cultural differences. The concern of Pancasila is all embracing universal values. It is about the ethical life that validates the rules of law in any given independent nation state. Pancasila serves to ground international order in peace and justice. It is similar to Max Scheler claims for social interactions to be based on an order of love (Ordo Amoris). It is because love is the maximum of justice and justice is the minimum of love. For social relations to last in any given society must be based on the universal order of mutual respect.
The first Principle (Sila I) is “belief in the one and only God”. It suggests that the role of religion is moral power and not political power. As a result, religion is not the opposition to the state. The state protects and guarantees the freedom of worship.

Second Principle (Sila II) is “just and civilized humanity” which means universal values of humanity must be protected by the law for all its citizens, such as protection of physical security, family, ethnicity, property, and profession.

Third Principle (Sila III) is “the unity of Indonesia”. It means political nationalism and not an ethnic nationalism. Political nationalism is against sectarianism, primordialism, and discrimination.

Fourth Principle (Sila IV) is “democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives” which means democracy as the political system based on a liberal political culture.

Fifth Principle (Sila V) is “social justice for all of the people of Indonesia”. It means solidarity and political decision-making must respect those who are the least advantaged.

Through Pancasila, Soekarno shows that there is a synthesis in the struggle for recognition because Pancasila achieves its aims through a communicative process involving structural components of the life-world. Therefore Pancasila can be used to serve as social norms in establishing social interactions and seeking social conflict resolutions. It is conceived as a communicative imperative that respects diverse cultural identities. It is formulated on the basis of the better argument and therefore universally considered valid for all affected in their capacity as participants.

Unlike Huntington, Soekarno inclusively allowed whatsoever differences to be made part of setting the agreement. Culture, politics, and economy are matters in competing for the reasonable foundations for all affected to preserve differences through mutual respect and solidarity. The end of the cold world war is not the end of competing ideologies because what Huntington named cultural identities is basically expression of ideologies. What Soekarno experienced before the independence of
the Republic of Indonesia was political ideologies such as liberalism versus communism, capitalism versus socialism, and free world versus colonized world. During the end of cold world war Soekarno feared new emerging forces of ideological dominations through neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. Huntington’s division of the 1920s’ world map still remains: there is the free world and the rest. The fact that cold world war is over does not change the situation of the 1960s, rather there are new forms of ideological competition that result from what Soekarno called NECOLIM (neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism). The fear of the clash of civilizations cannot be handled only by means of awareness of cultural identities. Since cultural values are relative, we need to form solid foundations in morality as the grammar of our struggle for recognition. The formulation of such grammar can be found in Habermas’s theory of communicative action in which Pancasila reflects the basic idea that moral recognition validates enacted laws. The Latin well-known proverb says Quid leges sine moribus which means laws without character worthless. This trajectory to the Young Hegelian concept of Sittlichkeit come to terms with Honneth’s Anerkennung as the result of the struggle for recognition on which enacted laws can only attain validations for their being enforced if and only if they reflect morality of the people. This is for Habermas the Sollgeltung Prinzip of the validity of laws in modern societies. These are rules that command validity in speaking and acting by which social conflict resolutions are rationally accepted and procedurally well-arranged.

Pancasila is the recognition that we must meet cultural diversities half way. Therefore it can be used as a moral grammar in seeking the better argument for all affected in their capacity to make decisions which benefit them equally. Pancasila is both the (U)universal and the (D)iscourse principles in reference to Habermas’s theory of communicative action. As far as the five principles of Pancasila are concerned, Pancasila can be understood as the (U)universal concept of morality while such principles open to further (D)iscourse within diverse cultural identities in modern societies. Using Habermas’s distinction between the (U) and the (D) principles, Pancasila fulfills the following conditions:¹⁹
(U) All affected can accept the consequences, and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone (these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation).

Universal (U) principle is distinguished from discourse (D) principle which stipulates the basic idea of moral theory (theoretical discourse) but does not form part of a logic of argumentation (practical discourse).

(D) Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet or could meet with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.

The principle (D) is the assertion that the philosopher as a moral theorist ultimately seeks to justify, and already presupposes principle (U). From here one can see that Habermas’s discourse ethics deals with a rule of argumentation rather than testing normative claims. The aim is to redeem normative claims into validity claims through argumentations. Habermas emphasizes that only in the concrete life-world laws are legitimized by an argumentation that is free from any compulsion whether internal or external of a practical discourse. This means that laws are legitimate only if the following presuppositions are fulfilled.

1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in discourse.
2. a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
   b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into discourse.
   c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.
(3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2).²⁰

Using Habermas’s analysis of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development to relate stages of moral consciousness with models of democracy one can see that Pancasila is already in the sixth stage of moral grammar for grounding the validity of laws.

TABLE 1: TYPES OF LAWS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kohlberg’s stages of moral development</th>
<th>Relationship between morality and law</th>
<th>Habermas’s types of legal paradigms</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-conventional</td>
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<td>1. Tribal Societies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Revealed doctrines</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Sacred traditions</td>
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<td>Conventional</td>
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<td>2. Traditional Societies</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Customs</td>
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<td>• Ethical codes based on tradition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level A</td>
<td>Magical Ethics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
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<td>Right: punishment and obedience</td>
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<td>Stage 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Right: instrumental-purposive exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level B</td>
<td>Tradition</td>
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<td>Stage 3</td>
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<td>Right: mutual interpersonal relation and exchange</td>
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<td>Stage 4</td>
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<td>Right: social system and conscience maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kohlberg’s stages of moral development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-conventional</td>
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<td>3. Modern Pluralistic Societies</td>
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<td>Level C</td>
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<td>• Natural laws</td>
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<td>Stage 5</td>
<td>• Ethical/political and moral discourses</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>a. Classic Liberalism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Utilitarian and pragmatic discourses</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 6</td>
<td>• Procedural discourse</td>
<td>• Modern Law: system of actions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Right: <em>universal ethical principles</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Legal Positivism</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Legal Realism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reflective law: a. Universalized laws based on systems of actions and rights</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Soekarno believes that Pancasila involves universal ethical principles that come to existence through a procedural discourse from May 29 to June 1, 1945 held by BPUPKI (abbreviation of Indonesian to *Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* which means *The Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence*). On August 18, 1945, the day after the Proclamation of Indonesia’s Independence, Pancasila was finally established as the state philosophy by PPKI (abbreviation of Indonesian to Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia which means *The Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence*).²¹ Pancasila can be proposed as a model of the struggle for a moral grammar that can be discovered by modern societies in dealing with social conflicts and
resolutions if and only if they place mutual respect and solidarity on the highest priority.

Conclusion

Huntington’s approach to social conflict in modern societies through the clash of civilizations does not reflect phenomenological attitudes in the life-world since social conflicts are myriad of reasons. Culture is one of them. Fukuyama’s theory of the end of history seems to simplify the complexity of social systems into a liberal democratic system and therefore ignoring variety of cultural systems. As a shift in geopolitical paradigm, both Huntington and Fukuyama believe global politics must be based on a universal reason whether it is a universal culture or democracy.

Soekarno’s concept of Pancasila involves the idea that the struggle for recognition requires communicative action to preserve cultural identities while establishing laws on universally validating principles of morality. As Habermas’s theory of communicative action and Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition are concerned, Pancasila manifests the dialectic process in generalizing different cultural worldviews involving economy, culture, and politics and therefore Pancasila is compatible with the search for a moral grammar, through which the dreams of a new world can be built.

ENDNOTES

1The term *Sollgeltung* is taken from German language as it is used as validating principle of social norms on morality. “…As used for the validity component of legal validity, the expression “legitimacy” designates the specific kind of prescriptive validity (Sollgeltung) that distinguishes law from “morality.” Valid moral norms are “right” in the discourse-theoretic sense of just. Valid legal norms indeed harmonize with moral norms, but they are “legitimate” in the sense that they additionally express an authentic self-understanding of the legal community, the fair consideration of the values and
interests distributed in it, and the purposive-rational choice of strategies and means in
the pursuit of policies. See Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions

2 www.republika.co.id/…al-politics/12/05/08/m3pkhx
3 Plato, Crito. Par.50 b sq
5 Aristotle, *Politics*, Book I.
6 Ibid. Book III.
8 Jacqueline Waeber, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s unité de mélodie”, in *Journal
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9 Michael Blome-Tillmann, “Moral Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of
279-309. Published by: on behalf of WileyThe Aristotelian Society. Stable URL: http://
10 David Couzens Hoy, “Hegel’s Critique of Kantian Morality” in *History of
11 Massimo Rosati “Solidarity and the sacred: Habermas’s idea of solidarity in a
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13 Samuel B. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World
14 Ibid. pp.21-27.
15 Ibid.p. 21.
17 Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books,


Ibid., p. 89.