ON TAQIYYA, OR ON HOW NOT TO LIE

Qusthan Firdaus
Universitas Buddhi Dharma, Tangerang, Indonesia

ABSTRACT

This article attempts to clarify the concept of *taqiyya* (or dissimulation for religious purposes). It will examine if the concept is coherent, and whether practices of *taqiyya* follow its concept. The article first discusses the concept of *taqiyya*. Second, it reviews historical examples of its practice. Third, it examines the implications of the Ninth Commandment in the Bible. Fourth, it discusses the notion of ‘speaking justly’ in the Qur’an. And fifth, it examines the manner in which the practice of *taqiyya*, often deviates from its concept.

Introduction

Can we lie in order to protect ourselves and protect our faith? This article aims to examine the concept and the practices of *taqiyya*. By examining it, I wish to demonstrate that *taqiyya* is conceptually coherent though its practice might be abused to the degree that it deviates from the concept. In other words, this article will be an intellectual exercise comparing the concept and practices of *taqiyya*. Moreover,
one of the Ten Commandments prohibits us to bear false witness. This article brings into focus some questions such as: What is the concept of *taqiyya*? Is such concept coherent? Do practices of *taqiyya* concur with its concept? Does *taqiyya* violate the Ninth Commandment or the duty to not lie? What I mean by ‘to violate’ is failing or breaking to comply with a rule. In this particular case, the rule is the Ninth Commandment. Firstly, I will discuss the concept of *taqiyya*. Secondly, its historical references as well as its practices will be discussed. Thirdly, it will examine the implications of the Ninth Commandment. Fourthly, it will examine the notion of speaking justly in Qur’an. Fifthly, it will review a deviation of the practices from the concept of *taqiyya*. Then, I will conclude the discussion in the last section.

**The Concept of Taqiyya**

This section strives to illuminate the formal concept of *taqiyya*. The concept of *taqiyya* needs to be distinguished from other ideas such as *zaringí* (cleverness), *kizb* (lie), *hilah* (artifice), *gúl* (wiles), *makkár* (crafty), *talbís* (deceit), *firiftan* (deceive) *rihá* (evasion), *riyá kardan* (dissemble), *zabán-bazi* (prevarication), *fírb* (fraud), *jíb* (fob), *ílchí-gari* (diplomacy), *sákhtah* (trick), and probably the arcane discipline (due to its virtue of silence). Indeed, there are two constitutive elements of the concept of *taqiyya*, to wit, religious dissimulation and persecution. In other words, the concept is religious dissimulation for the sake of preserving life – not necessarily religion – to the extent that one’s belief remains firm under the threat of persecution. Moreover, dissimulation refers to hiding or to concealing one’s character, feelings, thoughts, or preventing those things to be known by others. Therefore, practitioners of dissimulation use it as a type of precautionary measure against persecution. Persecution itself means oppression, ill-treatment and hostility which can be caused by religious, political or racial factors. These factors do not have to appear all at once. If one factor is present, then the dissimulation could be justly conducted for the sake of preserving life.
Unfortunately, proponents of *taqiyya* seem to conduct the religious dissimulation merely based on danger which is a bit different from harm and indeed true persecution. On the one hand, danger refers to the mere possibility of being injured or harmed. On the other hand, harm refers to the real physical injury, pain, distress or hardship which is conducted directly. If harm is intentionally done based on political, racial or religious discrimination, then it is considered persecution. In short, danger could imply harm while the latter could imply persecution. Yet, they are not the same things.

Interestingly, some people think that the best form of *taqiyya* is *tawriya* (evasion). For instance, As-Sayid Ar-Radi gives an example about who the legitimate vicegerent of Prophet is. An evasive view would be, on the one hand, “He that his (Prophet’s) daughter was in his house,” to wit, ‘Ali or, on the other hand, “He whose daughter was in his (i.e., Prophet’s) house” viz., Abu Bakr (As-Sayid Ar-Radi in Rizvi, 1992: 11-3)” If such rhetoric is accepted, then *taqiyya* includes cunning because evasion contains the intention to deflect a controversial truth. Such deflection is exercised by a cunning person to deceive others. However, if such person did not face any persecution in replying, then his reply cannot be taken as *taqiyya* because persecution constitutes the existence of *taqiyya*. Additionally, two further questions might be considered here: Is a son in law (the Holy Prophet) a part of the family of his father in law (Abu Bakr)? Or is a father-in-law (Abu Bakr) a part of the family of his son-in-law (the Holy Prophet)? The answer actually depends on the concept of a family in a particular culture. If Arabic culture exercises patriarchy, then those two questions are irrelevant because the Holy Prophet has no lineage from Abu Bakr. In other words, it might be useless to evade others who are aware about the cultural meaning of such tricky utterance. On the contrary, Imam Ali is really the part of Holy Prophet’s family due to his position as a cousin as well as a son in law of the Holy Prophet. Therefore, we could say that his answer is to Hazrat Ali instead of Abu Bakr.
The concept should also be distinguished from the notion of ‘deception’ which means deliberately promoting a falsehood as a truth. In contrast, taqiyya deals with the notion of hiding instead of deceiving. As a proverb compels (x) ‘tell the truth,’ and then an Arabic wisdom compels (y) “Not all that is known should be said.” At this point, proposition (y) does not mean deceiving though it could be considered as an evasion as well as a diplomacy, and it could not be considered as taqiyya because there is no one slain. Moreover, such proposition is sound due to the absence of moral obligation to share all things but the obligation not to lie. Here, there is a distinction between telling lies and keeping information. The previous implies a violation of moral obligation while the latter implies a limited sharing of information.

Mahon furthermore identifies four categories that are essential to the determination of lying or deception. These are: the intention, the addressee condition, the untruthfulness condition and the statement condition (2008). First of all, the intention comprises three types viz., (1) the intention to deceive the liee about the content of the statement, (2) the intention to deceive the liee about the liar’s beliefs, (3) the intention to deceive the liee about the liar’s being sincere (Mahon, 2008). Here, taqiyya seems to include the second intention because by hiding the agent’s belief for the sake of avoiding persecution, then he or she is lying about his or her belief to the liee. Moreover, Mahon emphasizes that such intention should be addressed to persons. Thereby, expressing false statements to, for instance children or insane adults, could not be considered as lying (Mahon, 2008). Secondly, the addressee condition requires two persons or more. Therefore, this condition does not recognize the notion of self-deception (Mahon, 2008). Thirdly, the untruthfulness condition distinguishes between ‘believed to be false’ and ‘be false.’ Indeed, the notion of believing is central here. As a consequence, an intended lie cannot be a deception if the lie is, unknown to the liar, actually a fact. In short, a truth might be formed through an untruthful statement (Mahon, 2008). Fourthly, the statement condition includes a person’s utterance, expressions and language. However, silence might imply a
lie even though it is not spoken. Mahon indeed claims that ‘lying under duress’ is a *contradictio in terminis* because such action is made on the condition of no freedom (Mahon, 2008). If *taqiyya* is a form of lying under duress, then *taqiyya* itself is a *contradictio in terminis*. However, one might distinguish thoroughly between the notion of lying and hiding in order to rebut such claim.

Interestingly, Mahon poses the question whether the wrongness of lying is an *analytic* or a *synthetic* judgment (Mahon, 2008)? By the same token, I could pose a similar question, whether the rightness or wrongness of *taqiyya* an *analytic* or a *synthetic* judgment? On the one hand, if one examines the concept of *taqiyya*, then he or she is actually making an *analytic* judgment. On the other hand, if one examines the practices of *taqiyya*, then he or she is actually making a *synthetic* judgment. This distinction highlights the potential difference between the concept and the practice of *taqiyya*.

The word *taqiyya* is not explicitly mentioned in Qur’an. Yet, there might be a hidden concept as well as the *dalil naqli* of *taqiyya* in the Holy Book. Chapter Ali Imran verse 28-9 says:

“Let not the believers take for friends or helpers Unbelievers rather than believers: if any do that, in nothing will there be help from God: except by way of precaution, that ye may guard yourselves from them. But God cautions you (to remember) Himself; for the final goal is to God. Say: ‘Whether ye hide what is in your hearts or reveal it, God knows it all: He knows what is in the heavens, and what is on Earth. And God has power over all things’” (in Ali, NY: 47).

*Tafsir Al-Jalalayn* interprets such verse: “*tuqātan*, ‘as a safeguard’, is the verbal noun from *taqiyyatan*” in Qur’an 3: 28 (Al-Mahalli and al-Suyuti, 2007: 58). Indeed, Barletta interprets such verse: “The English phrase ‘guard yourselves against them, guarding carefully’ in the verses above comes directly from the Arabic *tattaqu¯ minhum tuqā¯ tan*, and both
tattaqu¯ ‘you [pl.] guard’ and tuqa¯tan (an adverbial intensifier) share the same root (w-q-a¯) as taqiyya...” (Barletta, 2008: 564). Moreover, verse makes the point that (1) favouring unbelievers instead of believers to be the friends and helpers is forbidden, and (2) an exception can be made when a believer would be harmed if they do not make friendship with the unbelievers. Yet, the Qur’an does not specifically indicate political affiliation of unbelievers because the Qur’an never deals with details. Indeed, an emphasis should be made here on the distinction between the unbelievers and the non-Muslims (including Christians, Jews and other religious people). Moreover, the context of the verse is a warning from Allah after a previous warning – from Sa’d bin Hatsamah, Abdullah bin Jubair and Rifa’ah bin Al-Mundzir – was ignored by some people of the Anshar community. These people were induced to leave Islam as well as appoint non-Muslims to be their protectors. However, the unbelievers such as Alhajjaj bin Amr, Qais bin Zaid, Ibnu Abil Haqiq, and Ka’b bin Al-Asyraf fail to convince them because of this warning (Qamaruddin Shaleh et. al, NY: 90). Nevertheless, Allah provides an exception where Muslims might conduct a precautionary action against persecution by taking the unbelievers either as helpers or as alliances.

Another hidden concept as well as the dalil naqli of taqiyya is Chapter Al Nahl verse 106 which commands: “Any one who, after accepting faith in God, utters Unbelief -- except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in Faith -- but such as open their breast to Unbelief, on them is Wrath from God, and theirs will be a dreadful Penalty” (in Ali, NY: 257).

There are two historical contexts for such verses. Firstly, the Quraisy ethnic groups tortured some individuals who strove to relocate themselves from Mecca to Medina. As a consequence, some of those migrants are forced to be infidels. Then, Allah made a revelation to the Prophet Muhammad saying that Allah will forgive such a thing if, and only if, there is faith in their hearts. Secondly, there was a dialogue between the Prophet Muhammad and Ammar bin Yasir who just saved himself from an unjust detainment by a tribe of polytheists. Indeed, Ammar’s
eloquent rhetoric astonished the polytheists, and he was therefore set free. The Prophet Muhammad asked Ammar whether his rhetoric was sincere. Ammar replied no. This verse confirms that Allah will not put a curse on those who are forced to be atheists insofar as they keep the faith (Shaleh et al., NY: 286-7). By these two examples, Allah seems to allow a practice of taqiyya. The concept holds that no one may convert unless under the compulsion, and if they are forced to convert, they ought to hold the faith firmly in their hearts. The notion of compulsion questions the coherency of such concept. Imagine that the compulsion is an unjust one, then how can we know that the faith is genuine? The Prophet Muhammad himself could not examine directly whether or not Ammar bin Yasir was being honest. Moreover, Allah and Islam do not allow hypocrisy in the sense of there is no consistency between utterances and deeds. Therefore the idea of taqiyya cannot be simply understood through the above examples, although the notion of ‘a firm faith in the hearts’ is still essential for us.

In addition, the concept of taqiyya is unlikely to be similar with the concept of piety. Rizvi, for example, conceives that taqiyya equals tuqat which is accordingly synonymous to piety (Rizvi, 1992: 2). According to Abu Ja’far Ibn Babawayh, such equivalence roots in Imam Ja’far’s view especially when he gave a comment on the Holy Qur’an Surah Al-Hujuraat verse 13. To put it precisely: “Imam Ja’far was asked concerning the Word of Allah, Mighty and Glorious is He: “Verily the noblest among you, in the sight of Allah, is the most pious” [49, 13]. He said: (It means) he who adheres most scrupulously to the practice of taqiyya” (Babawayh, 1999: 97). Additionally, taqiyya equals tuqat equals piety according to Rizvi (Rizvi, 1992: 2). Nevertheless, piety has a different concept compared to taqiyya viz., the quality of reverence or being religious. Thereby, aligning the concept of taqiyya with piety implies two questions at least: how could a religious dissimulation (against persecution) be similar with the quality of being religious? Does not reverence need no dissimulation at all because God will assist all pious persons? Unfortunately, Rizvi provides no further explanations and
answers to such questions. An answer to the first question might be in the realm of consequentialist account of ethics, but unfortunately proponents of taqiyya treat the concept as a virtue or a duty. If this is the case, then the first question could not be replied convincingly because it seems to be a contradictio in terminis. Shouldn’t a religious person express his or her religious belief without concealment? By showing his or her religious belief, this person would be able to propagate his or her faith. Moreover, the second question deals with a contradictio in terminis of aligning taqiyya with piety or tuqat. Briefly, proponents of taqiyya seem to obfuscate the concept.

In a nutshell, taqiyya is a coherent concept to the extent that the concept is dissimulating one’s religious belief in order to preserve life (not necessarily religion) against persecution. The claim of coherency lies in the prerequisite of religious dissimulation viz., the existence of persecution. Yet, its proponents might practically deviate from it as I will discuss in the next section.

The Practices of Taqiyya

The way people put taqiyya into practice often deviates from its concept. In this section I will examine these pseudo-practices. Such distinction is based on the concept of taqiyya as I have discussed in the previous section.

The historical fact that Sayyidina Ali lived under three caliphs before him (Abu Bakar, Umar ibn Khattab and Usman ibn Affan) is usually taken as a classical example and a justification for taqiyya. For example, Walker refers taqiyya to Imam Ali’s life. Walker claims that Ali swore loyalty to the three caliphs (Walker, 2014). Nevertheless, such claim ignores the political background. Jafri et al., for instance, believe that the case demonstrates a tension between the northern and southern Arabian traditions concerning who the successor of late Prophet Muhammad should be. On the one hand, seniority in age and ability in leadership are two decisive points to succession in the northern Arab tribes (Jafri et al.,
Thereby, proposing Abu Bakar – who is also the Prophet’s father-in-law – who is persuaded by Umar ibn Khattab (Mutahhari in Thalib, 2009: 240). On the other hand, divine rights and hereditary sanctity are two main essential points to succession in the southern Arab tribes. Therefore, Ali – the Prophet’s cousin; his son in law; the first man who recognized Muhammad’s prophecy; and had been educated by the Prophet since he was child – should be the first caliph. Indeed, such view is justified by the Gadhir Khumm [a pond between Mecca and Medina] sermon delivered by the Prophet (Mutahhari in Thalib, 2009: 211-25). In other words, one might say that the case is about the struggle of power between primarily the companions of the Prophet against the family of the late Prophet. On the contrary, Ali remained calm and he did not pursue the opportunity to be the first caliph because he realized that there would be a total war within Arabia. Even though Ali and his family faced persecution and attacks on their home, he did not conduct the religious dissimulation and did not acquiesce to the rulers though the latter sometimes asked Ali’s views on many problems. Furthermore, he did not join the government because Ali followed a reclusive life right after the death of Fatima and the Holy Prophet at the same year. In a nutshell, taqiyya could not be referred to Ali’s reclusive life from 11 A. H., up to 35 A. H.

Furthermore, taqiyya does not imply estrangement from the world. In other words, taqiyya allows involvement in the world including politics and government. Moreover, taqiyya implies a boundary between an agent and a persecutor. On the contrary, Hazrat Ali lived an unsocial reclusive life. Yet, such reclusion was only because of his circumstances. The Prophet had appointed Ali as his vicegerent on the Gadhir Khumm, but then some companions “conspired” against him. However, Ali continued to impart his knowledge and wisdom for the three caliphs. Umar ibn Khattab, for example, made some consultations to Ali, and the latter supervised sincerely though Umar is the one who persuaded Banu Sa’ida, Ansar and Muhajirun to elect Abu Bakar as the first caliph instead of Ali. Furthermore, Umar ibn Khattab enjoyed the transfer of power from Abu Bakar to himself by no election. In short, there is no alienation from
the world Ali’s refusal to join the government. Ali continued to give supervision due to his knowledge and wisdom.

Additionally, we could learn from the history of Imam Hassan and Hussein. On the one hand, had Imam Hussein ibn Ali – the younger one – held taqiyyya, he would not be beheaded by Yazid ibn Muawiyah in Karbala. In this particular case, it is difficult to support a view which says that Imam Hussein was not in favor of taqiyyya because he thought that the consequence of taqiyyya would damage the belief of his followers (Rizvi, 1992: 13). However, a more prudent interpretation would be that he felt that taqiyyya would be useless since Yazid’s main purpose was eliminating Imam Ali’s offspring. What would the historical evidence be that Imam Hussein really held such a view? In addition, Imam Hussein could never know what the result of taqiyyya would be because he did not practice it. Indeed, Imam Hussein was inclined to follow his beloved father who did not join the government of three caliphs. Therefore, taqiyyya seems to be practiced neither by Imam Ali nor Imam Hussein. In the case of Imam Hussein, one might distinguish between being slain and being conquered. Hobbes interestingly conceives it in Leviathan:

“Conquest, is not the Victory itself; but the Acquisition by Victory, of a Right, over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain is Overcome, but not Conquered: He that is taken, and put into prison, or chains, is not Conquered, though Overcome...” (Hobbes, 1985: 720).

This means that, if one does not resort to taqiyyya, then neither he himself nor his conviction can be conquered, as in the case of being slain. Here, Hobbes account concurs with our analysis that the preservation of Islam, not necessarily its school of thoughts, does not rely on the existence of its adherents but rather on the Holy Qur’an.

In contrast, Imam Khomeini relates some fascinating accounts of taqiyyya because his account not only holds that the existence of Islam and its school of thoughts rely on the existence of its adherents but also
strives to inhibit the agents of *taqiyya*. His argument proceeds as below:

1) One must determine the number of agents of imperialism as well as pay close attention to the principle of *taqiyya* in order to establish and speak about an Islamic government (Khomeini, 1979: 20).

2) One must consider the main cause of *taqiyya* viz., the fear of the existence of true religion before the tyrannical rulers instead of the safety of themselves. If they are reluctant to conduct *taqiyya*, the existence of Islam would be put at stake (Khomeini, 1979: 54).

3) *Taqiyya* must not be done by the Islamic jurists (*fuqaha*) due to their functions and positions as the experts of Islamic law, and Islam would be unclean had the jurists resorted to *taqiyya*. Indeed, Khomeini emphasized that Imam Ja’far saying (*‘taqiyya* is my religion, and the religion of my forefathers’) does not apply to the jurists unless there is a rational basis for doing so. In other words, *taqiyya* could be perceived as ablution either by water or dust, dependent on the situation (Khomeini, 1979: 115-6).

4) Fear for the existence of Islam is the real basis of *taqiyya* instead of fear for one’s life (Khomeini, 1979: 118).

Nevertheless, Imam Khomeini’s account (of *taqiyya* and the jurists) – respectfully – is open to some criticism. The first premise is important because, I suppose, Khomeini would like to distinguish friend from foe. Nevertheless, if an Islamic government relies on *taqiyya*, then it means the government should wait for the threat of persecution because the concept of *taqiyya* requires the existence of persecution. The second premise is unfortunately unsound because the purity of Islam does not depend on individual jurists but is located in Qur’an the Holy Book which is guaranteed by Allah to be pure forever. The fourth premise also seems
unconvincing because the jurists (not necessarily the Imams) have the same rights as ordinary people on the issue of preserving life. Indeed, the existence and the purity of Islam do not depend on the jurists but rather on the Qur’an which is guaranteed by Allah to always be pure.

Another practical deviation of taqiyya is presented by this account:

“And Imam Ja’far said: Verily, I hear a man abusing me in the mosque; and I hide myself behind a pillar so that he may not see me. And he (Imam Ja’far) said: Mix with the people (enemies) outwardly, but oppose them inwardly, so long as the Amirate (imratun) is a matter of opinion. And he also said: Verily diplomacy (arri ‘a’) with a true believer is a form of shirk (polytheism); but with a hypocrite (munafiq) in his own house, it is worship” (Babawayh, 1999: 97-8).

Such account is not taqiyya. Some cases should be examined separately because they are arguably dissimilar. First is the case of physical dissimulation. It is different because it is visible as opposed to religious dissimulation which is invisible. The former does not imply the latter. If it did, then playing hide and seek world require children to dissimulate their beliefs as well. Yet, this is implausible because such game merely practice physical dissimulation while, in contrast, taqiyya requires religious dissimulation. Second is the case of mingling with enemies. Insofar as conflicting political communities do not wage neither a limited nor total war, then mingling is normal under an oppressive regime. One does not need to resort to taqiyya for living together. Here, there is a confusion of taqiyya with mingling. Third is case of doing diplomacy with enemies. Such an exclusion is implausible because people negotiate in all situations including war. If two warring political communities have the opportunity to negotiate a truce, then all proponents of taqiyya would favor diplomacy. Furthermore, taqiyya is perceived by some proponents as an obligation which holds the same importance as shalat. Babawayh claims: “Our belief concerning taqiyya (permissible dissimulation) is that it is obligatory, and he who forsakes it is in the same position as he who
forsakes prayer” (Babawayh, 1999: 96). If this is the case, can prayers be replaced by taqiyya? If shalat is a pillar of Islam, then is taqiyya also a pillar of Islam? Babawayh’s argument needs to be considered thoroughly, and one should not accept it uncritically because it might be a deviation of taqiyya, as I will discuss in the last section.

A controversial practice of taqiyya is seen in India and Spain. The Indian Guptis lived incognito as Hindus instead of Sunni Muslims, and indeed they even burned corpses (Virani, 2011: 99-100). According to Virani, two details of taqiyya might be dismissed by Shi’i dissimulators viz., (1) do not disseminate esoteric teachings to those who are not ready, and (2) conceal the link between the imam and his followers, as exposure would lead to danger (Virani, 2011: 101). Interestingly, the Guptis believe that they could be both Hindus and Muslims. They believed that there is no contradiction between those two faiths. They furthermore argue that if it is admissible to be a Muslim as well as believing the teaching of Isa A. S., then there is no contradiction to be a Muslim and believing in the avatars (Virani, 2011: 125-7). Nor as a temporary mechanism, the Guptis are in favour of prolonging taqiyya for the lifetime of its preachers should they deal with pogroms. Moreover, they perceive that taqiyya has an adaptive, dynamic nature. Consequently, the pure hidden identity should also be preserved by a strong intrinsic nucleus which is -- in the case of Ismailis -- manifested in the imam of the time (Virani, 2011: 132-3). Actually, taqiyya which involves a second religion is not unique to the Guptis but had been practiced by the 16th century Moriscos against the Spanish Inquisition. Interestingly, they did it for centuries rather than for a short period of time. They practiced taqiyya for more than one generation because the Turks unfortunately did not restore the Islamic power as the Mufti of Oran previously announced it through his fatwa (Rosa-Rodriguez, 2010: 153). Similarly, Barletta claims “…the principle of taqiyya came to have an important place within the underground religious activities of Castile’s recently converted Muslims after 1502, and it was rapidly applied within the communities of Aragonese converts after 1526” (Barletta, 2008: 564). Nonetheless, the Gupti’s Ismaili
dissimulation as Hindus and the Spanish Moriscos are some “extreme” examples of inappropriate practices of taqiyya though they were in response to harassment. It is extreme because the veneer in both cases is neither as Sunni Muslims, Sufi nor the Twelver. In contrast, why didn’t they emigrate (hijrah as the Prophet did from Mecca to Medina) instead of living under the hostile Hindu regime? For instance, besides resorting to taqiyya, some other Moroccans migrated to Iran in 1986 right after the persecution against the Baha’is (Zweiri and Konig, 2008: 520). Hijrah is essential here to avoid resorting to taqiyya. If Muslims live under occupation, then why didn’t emigrate as the Prophet did? However, this criticism could not be used on the case of Palestine where they arguably maintain al-Quds (Jerusalem).

The 1979 Islamic revolution of Iran could be considered a turning point against the practices of taqiyya. Shiite Muslims around the globe now have an established Shi’ite political power. Few days before the returning of Imam Khomeini, an Iranian magazine published a poem as following:

“The day the Imam returns
no one will tell lies any more
no one will lock the doors of his house;
people will become brothers
sharing the bread of their joys together
in justice and in sincerity...” (in Simpson, 1989: 36-7).

The second line of such poem might refer to taqiyya because Iranians formerly eschewed the perils of Pahlevi’s military and SAVAK. Campbell, for example, pays a very serious attention to taqiyya in the case of Iran and wrote at least four articles in the National Observer. Firstly, Campbell points to four factors which are responsible for Iran’s propensity for deception through history viz., taarof (“a form of deception through diversion of meaning from the subject or issue under discussion”), khod’eh (“trickery or claiming one’s true position by half-truths rather than outright lies or deception”), kitman (deception) or taqiyya. Yet he claims that these terms are “often used synonymously” (Campbell, 2006b:
1, 5). But he is mistaken because these terms have distinct meanings. Campbell fails to recognize the appropriate concept of *taqiyya* which deals with the notion of persecution. He also employs his misunderstanding of *taqiyya* as a basis for dissimulation over the case of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons. Indeed, he claims: “Given the proven Iranian capacity for deception, combined with the parlous state of intelligence coverage of Iran by Western intelligence, there may be a parallel clandestine programme and concealed facilities or research programmes using cover organisations (Campbell, 2006b: 48).” Secondly, he furthermore claims that *taqiyya* played an important role in the 1979 Islamic revolution. To put it in his own words:

“The CIA documents seized during the Iranian 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy revealed that the approximately 5,000 “sources of information” were recruited...The documents showed that many Iranians agreed to “become informants, informers or outright spies partly in order to advance their own careers in business or the civil service”. Consequently, they fed the United States with “information that suited their own personal schemes”. In the 1970s, this meant that an unusually high percentage of the information gathered was biased or unreliable and contaminated by the Iranian passion for deception. The documents also demonstrate the vital role of counterintelligence in checking the bonafides of Iranian HUMINT (i.e., human intelligence) sources” (Campbell, 2006b: 43).

Moreover, he claims that American and European diplomats have been deceived by Iranian diplomats for three decades in the case of Iran’s nuclear program. The latter have exercised a combination of *taqiyya*, *khod’eh* and *kitman* to do so (Campbell, 2006b: 44). Campbell also distinguishes between diplomacy and *taqiyya* because he considers the E.U.-3 as no more than, on the one hand, showing the impotence of I.A.E.A., and on the other hand, reflecting the appeasement of European diplomacy (Campbell, 2006a: 12-3). He also comprehends that *kitman*
contains an equal meaning to secrecy (Campbell, 2006a: 12). However, Rizvi rebuts such distinction, and he believes that *taqiyya* equals diplomacy as I will discuss below.

He erroneously puts *taqiyya* as a part of *kitman* (Campbell, 2006a: 18). In fact, some Imams establishes the concept of *taqiyya*, and such establishment does not deal with the idea of *kitman*. Moreover, Campbell notes, “The significant clandestine nuclear network of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan — the Pakistani nuclear engineer who had begun supplying Iran with nuclear designs, prototypes and advanced technology in the late 1980s — was not targeted by U.S./U.K. intelligence until the late 1990s” (Campbell, 2006a: 24). Additionally, Rothwell believes that even the president of Iran does not know about the nuclear program. He wrote:

> “Rothwell describes the secrecy cloaking Iran’s nuclear programmes: “The reality … is hard even for quasi-insiders to fathom. One Tehran observer with former ties to the power structure said in an interview that not even [the then] President Khatami and his ministers would know the truth about Iran’s nuclear program. Outside the closed scientific facilities, said this source: ‘You could count on the fingers of one hand the number of people who know the real goal of Iran’s nuclear project’”” (Rothwell in Campbell, 2006a: 19-20).

How extensive is secrecy in Iran that even its president did not know about the nuclear program? If Khatami’s administration knew nothing, then who would know it? If supposing the Supreme Leader was one of the few who knew the truth about nuclear program, then, why not share it with the president? Insofar that neither Rothwell nor Campbell give a sound argument for such ultimate secrecy of the nuclear program, then such a claim would be no more than a fantasy. Furthermore, Campbell describes how big the political contribution of *taqiyya* for the Islamic revolution was leading the CIA to repeatedly err their analysis from 1977 up to 1979.
“The C.I.A. has an especially poor predictive record. In August 1977, its 60-page study, Iran in the 1980s, assessed that the Shah would be “an active participant in Iranian life well into the 1980s”. In August 1978, the C.I.A.’s benign 23-page assessment of the Pahlavi dynasty/Shah’s régime, Iran After the Shah, declared in its preface: “Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a ‘prerevolutionary’ situation.” In November 1978, an assessment was satisfied that the Shah was “not paralysed with indecision” and was generally “in touch with reality”, even though he was suffering from cancer and adversely effected by his medication. Only two months later, the Shah and his régime collapsed. According to a former C.I.A. officer: “Even when Ayatollah Khomeini was in exile outside of Paris, the C.I.A. avoided him and his entourage. So when the Iranian revolution went down in 1979, the C.I.A. was blind and deaf in Iran”” (Campbell, 2006a: 20-1).

The prevalent methodological vulnerability of CIA is accordingly the failure to recognize *taqiyya* and *kitman* in the first place (Campbell, 2006a: 23). Contrary to Campbell’s account, an appropriate orientalist account of *taqiyya* is given by Bernard Lewis. He precisely conceives, “The term *taqiyya*, caution, precaution, denotes an Islamic concept of dispensation – the idea that under compulsion or menace, a believer may be dispensed from fulfilling certain conditions of religion … It was used to justify the concealment of beliefs likely to arouse the hostility of the authorities or the populace”” (Lewis in Campbell, 2005a: 13). This is an objective orientalist view about *taqiyya*. It converts the concept of *taqiyya* which is passive, into the active one. Campbell provocatively notes:

“Of the 55 Caliphs (successors list), including the first four caliphs, an estimated 18 to 26 were assassinated. The Assassins pioneered Islamic “martyrdom operations”, whose volunteers called themselves *fidaen* from the Arabic *fidaii* — a person ready to sacrifice his life for Islam.
The *fidayiyaah* (*fidais* or *fidawis*), or the “self-sacrificers”, specialised in targeted assassination of elite political, religious or military leaders... Using *taqiyya*, the Assassins became masters of disguise and often assumed the shape of the enemy... Using *taqiyya* the assassins posed as servants, advisors, soldiers, Sufis or Christian monks and ascetics to gain access to their target and humiliated and shamed the victim” (Campbell, 2005a: 15). Additionally, he also loosened *taqiyya* into some modes such as outwitting and the role-playing as victims (Campbell, 2005a: 16, 20).

Such claim is unfortunately inaccurate since neither Sunni nor Shi’i Muslims recognize all of those 55 caliphs. He also ignores that the concept of *taqiyya* does not deal with an aggressive attack but rather a mechanism of defense against hostile rulers. In other words, Campbell supports the practical deviation of *taqiyya* from its concept.

Furthermore, Campbell fallaciously believes that multiculturalism is a favorable milieu for *taqiyya* because of immigration policies which permit Muslims to live in Western countries. Furthermore, unproductive disagreements among Muslim leaders are misleadingly based on *taqiyya*. *Taqiyya* also complicates the counter-terrorism especially on some occasions such as refusing to investigate other Muslims or writing some misleading translations (Campbell, 2005b: 27-30). However, Campbell’s analysis is wrong because the oppressive regimes imply the need for *taqiyya*. Had multiculturalism created a favorable condition for *taqiyya*, Muslims would not split into various sects. In other words, Shia Muslims, Indian Guptis, and Spanish Moriscos didn’t need to face unjustified oppression across history had there been a spirit of multiculturalism. Moreover, Campbell erroneously generalizes that *taqiyya* be applied to all Muslims across the school of thoughts (*mazhab*). He dismisses the fact that not all Muslims accept *taqiyya* either as a concept or a praxis. Moreover, he unconvincingly proposes that *taqiyya* supports terrorism, and he dismisses the most important concept of jihad *akbar* (the greater jihad) as a personal struggle against one’s own natural appetite.
Taqiyya under the threat of persecution is obviously different from infiltrating intentionally into a country and then camouflaging themselves like chameleons do. The former is justified while the latter is an aberration of taqiyya. In taqiyya, there is no feeling of guilt because faith remains intact. If a person of taqiyya feels guilty, then his or her faith might not be firm, and this case could not be considered as taqiyya. In other words, the notion of disgust does not exist in the concept of taqiyya because one faces the threat of persecution. Moreover, taqiyya cannot be morally used as a military tactic to attack others as applied by the assassins and Fedayeen led by Hassan-i Sabbah (1040-1124); but it is merely a shield against unjustified persecution. Therefore, taqiyya should be practiced in a passive way. In contrast, some practices of taqiyya which I have discussed above seem to be an aberration of the concept of taqiyya because those practices ignore the existence of persecutions. Furthermore, I will consider taqiyya as a duty which is embedded in the Ten Commandments in the following section.

The Ninth Commandment

By considering the connection of taqiyya with the Ninth Commandment, I wish I could show whether or not taqiyya could be considered a negative moral duty. One out of the Ten Commandments states “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.” Such command is literally the particular negative. Consequently, some questions could be raised here. Is such a commandment comparable with the prohibition on lying? This section suggests that they are a bit different due to their scope and acts. The scope of the ninth commandment is relatively specific compared to the prohibition on lying. The former encompasses merely our neighbors but it suggests that one is allowed to bear false witness against, for instance, strangers. Not only did God reveal the Torah and the Bible where God commands directives for living in a specific society at a specific time. In contrast, it is considered that God revealed Qur’an for all societies at all times.
Moreover, is there any similarity between ‘bearing false witness’ and ‘lying’? There is according to its conceptual components. Evidence, proof and testimony constitute the component of witness. In contrast, saying falsehoods constitute the component of lying. Therefore, one could see a difference between ‘bearing false witness’ and ‘lying.’ Next, is it essential to distinguish between our neighbors and non-neighbors? It is essential because neighbors play a direct interaction to us while non-neighbors do not. Indeed, some (if not most) Indonesians conceive neighbors as equal family. This might also be the case in other South East Asian countries such as Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines. In other words, some cultures allow to distinguishing neighbors and non-neighbors based on the notion of familiarity. Therefore, there might be some differences between our duties to our neighbors and our duties to non-neighbors. On the one hand, for one lying to neighbors is unjustified while, on the other hand, for one lying to non-neighbors is justified according to a strict interpretation of the Ninth Commandment.

There are two prohibitions here. Firstly, is a prohibition not to bear false witness against our neighbors (the particular negative due to its scope), and suggests that one might bear false witness against non-neighbors. Secondly, is a prohibition not to lie (the universal negative due to its scope). This prohibition is a universal duty that one ought not to break under any circumstance. Taqiyya violates the Ninth Commandment because the latter is a token of a deontological approach. It means that one ought not break it in any situation. This seems to be consistent with the Prophet’s, Imam Ali’s and Imam Hussein’s positions as I have discussed above.

**Speaking Justly**

This section will attempt to demonstrate that the obligation stated in the Ninth Commandment is different from the obligation stated in the Holy Qur’an. By establishing such distinction, I hope I could show that
Muslims follow a moral obligation that differs somewhat from Jews and Christians. Moreover, advocates of taqiyya could argue that taqiyya does not deal with lies but rather with justice because Qur’an does not express its message in the way the Ninth Commandment does. Surah Al-An’am verse 151-2 states:

“Say: “Come, I will rehearse what God hath (really) prohibited you from”: Joint not anything as equal with Him; be Good to your parents; kill not your children on a plea of want; We provide sustenance for you and for them; come not nigh to shameful deeds. Whether open or secret; take not life, which God hath made sacred, except by way of justice and law: thus doth He command you, that ye may learn wisdom. And come not nigh to the orphan’s property, except to improve it, until he attain the age of full strength; give measure and weight with (full) justice; no burden do We place on any soul, but that which it can bear; whenever ye speak, speak justly, even if a near relative is concerned; and fulfill the covenant of God: thus doth He command you, that ye may remember” (Q. S. Al-An’am: 151-2 in Ali, NY: 133).

Those two verses speak about the negative duties for Muslims such as 1) no allegiance against Allah; 2) be good to our parents (the Second Commandment in a sequential order); 3) no killing of our own children (be specific than the Ten Commandments); 4) avoid disgraceful deeds; 5) no unjustified, unlawful killing; 6) no appropriation of orphans’ wealth unless it is for the purpose of improving their condition; 7) speak justly though our own relatives might not be in favor of it; 8) fulfill the Gods’ covenant. The deontological approach in ethics pays attention to such duties though it refers the Ten Commandments. Yet, there is a distinction concerning the duty about speaking between the Ninth Commandment and the Qur’an. On the one hand, the former only deals with the prohibition against lying to our neighbors as I have discussed in the previous section. On the other hand, the latter deals with the command to
speak justly. Speaking justly means expressing one’s feeling concerning what is morally fair or right. Therefore, it compels humans to speak the truth even though our own relatives could consequently suffer punishment. Speaking justly is obviously different from the Ninth Commandment in the Old Testament. An obvious difference is that just speaking has the scope of universal affirmative, to wit, a general positive command towards all human beings. If speaking honestly implies a persecution, then one can lie for the sake of their life, and such lying should be considered as a form of justice over himself or herself. Such preservation is much more important compared to, for instance, breathing and eating which are also essential for our life. In short, speaking justly might include taqiyya in a very specific context, lying for the sake of preserving ourselves against the threat of persecution.

By those differences on such categorical syllogism, we can see that the Ninth Commandment -- according to the Old Testament -- contains some differences compared to the one within Qur’an. This is significant for our comparison because we should comprehend taqiyya and its justifications correctly.

Speaking justly could not establish taqiyya because they comprise different structures. On the one hand, taqiyya comprises persecution and religious dissimulation. On the other hand, speaking justly comprises utterances and justifiable aims. The notion of speaking justly might imply taqiyya but not necessarily establishing it. Similarly, the concept of speaking justly is not compatible with the concept of taqiyya because the previous deals with a larger scope compared to the latter.

Taqiyya’s opponents might perceive taqiyya to be equal with cunning in the sense of skills to evade or deceive in order to achieve goals. On the one hand, evasion could contain a lesser moral problem compared to deception because it means answering questions indirectly. On the other hand, deceit obscures the true sense of taqiyya, and indeed it distorts it. Here, I should reiterate dissimulations do not necessarily mean deceptions though it might be consistent with evasion. Indeed, evasion plays a significant role in the realm of diplomacy. Interestingly,
some people -- such as Najmuddin Tufi -- refers *taqiyya* to other ideas such as diplomacy, common sense and tolerance (Tufi in Rizvi, 1992: 14). Unfortunately, neither Tufi nor Rizvi create any argument to support it. Yet, we could comprehend that in *taqiyya*, evasion and diplomacy are consistent though this could not be the case with common sense and tolerance. Here, Tufi’s argument rebuts Campbell’s distinction between *taqiyya* and diplomacy as I have discussed above.

Moreover, Imam Fakhruddin ar-Razi conceives four rules of *taqiyya*. First, professing religion and manifesting enmity or friendship are two permissible conditions for conducting *taqiyya*. Yet, *taqiyya* could not be misused as tools for disclosing the weakness of Muslims’ defense, defaming a married woman, usurping properties, adultery and implying the killing of the third parties. Secondly, *taqiyya* – according to the mazhab Imam Syafi’i – may be conducted in the case of facing polytheistic rulers although the Qur’anic indirect permitting of *taqiyya* strictly refers to the case of facing infidels. Thirdly, *taqiyya* may be conducted in the case of protecting property due to the Prophet’s view that the holiness of Muslims’ blood is equal with the sanctity of their property. Therefore, they who are slain in defending their property could be regarded as martyrs. Fourthly, due to the obligation to avoid harm, Muslims are permitted to conduct *taqiyya* up to the Day of Resurrection (Ar-Razi in Rizvi, 1992: p. 7-8). Nonetheless, the third point is problematic due to the concept of *taqiyya* itself. The concept pays no attention to the protection of property unless our own bodies can be considered as a sort of property as in the case of Nozick’s libertarianism. Thereby, releasing property in order to avoid costly calamity could be consequentially justified as a trade off with the religious belief. Furthermore, the fourth point exposes the criticism such as what sort of harm might justify a long-run *taqiyya*? Harm which is done in a just war is obviously morally different from harm which is caused by terrorism. Thereby, extending the duration of *taqiyya* up to the Day of Resurrection is a form of exaggeration.

Interestingly, Imam Ali expressed an interesting account against *taqiyya* whenever he received an oath of loyalty from the companions as
follow: “By Allah, I have not concealed a single word or spoken any lie and I had been informed of this event and of this time (Sermon 16 in Thalib, 2009: 351). It means that Imam Ali himself was arguably reluctant to lie and conceal words or, to put it in other way, he does not resort to taqiyya because the latter does not allow us to speak justly either to ourselves or to other persons. Therefore, adherents should not apply taqiyya to Hazrat Ali’s life but consider it in the sense of speaking justly. By developing it, proponents would take benefit from the art of speaking including an evasion, as diplomacy, and not telling ‘all’ known things. This mode of thinking would shape the practices of taqiyya in a positive way though it would constitute a deviation of taqiyya from its original concept.

Persecution or Social Exclusion?

This section will discuss whether dissimulators can justify their actions based on mere social exclusion instead of persecution? Additionally, can the social exclusion be a prerequisite of persecution? And if so, can performing taqiyya based on social exclusion be justifiable?

Taqiyya should always be understood through consequentialist and utilitarian (the maslahat-mafsadat) approaches because its concept actually reflects trade off between life and faith. If taqiyya is examined by the deontological and virtuous approaches, then taqiyya would be in contradiction with the Ninth Commandment as I have discussed above. By allowing religious dissimulation against persecution, life – under the banner of taqiyya – is given emphasis over religion. Nevertheless, some Shi’ite imams conceive this differently; that it is not life but religion which should be preserved by taqiyya. By placing religion as the taqiyya’s sole aim, taqiyya enjoys the status of urgency in Islam. Additionally, they wish taqiyya would be widely accepted by all Muslims in such a way. Therefore, they imply that religion is more important than life. They nevertheless dismiss the fact that religion without the life of its Ummah would be meaningless for a certain period of time. Moreover, they also push aside the existence and purity of Islam which are located in the Holy Qur’an instead of its Ummah. Therefore, religions could not outweigh life.
Persecution and preserving life justify the existence of *taqiyya*. By preserving life, one has more chance to develop one’s belief, knowledge, and other meaningful things. Another argument in favor of *taqiyya* is apparently concealing faith justly. A just concealment contains a lesser evil compared to being killed or unjustly persecuted. However, *taqiyya* seems to be ineffective concerning some injustices. For example, Indonesian Shiī Muslims do not face persecution nowadays, but unjust expulsion by Indonesian Sunni Muslims. Based upon the latter’s ignorance some conflicts occurred in Sampang, Madura, Jawa and Timur. Misunderstanding of what Shiism is seems to be the cause. They argue that Shia is not a part of Islam because it follows different pillars of Islam. In contrast, Maduranese Shiī Muslims cannot resort to *taqiyya* based on expulsion. If expulsion *is* persecution, then their *taqiyya* would be justifiable on the basis of persecution.

Mortimer pays attention to the role of *taqiyya* in the sense that the Imams of Ithna Ashari allows their followers to hide their religious beliefs if necessary. Moreover, Mortimer does not believe that *taqiyya* preserves the existence of Twelver Shiīte but rather the latter was not political or did not historically involve in the action-oriented-politics. Indeed, nine out of twelve Imams after Hussein did not pursue their rights to reign. They preferred instead to live an ascetic life (*zuhd*) (Mortimer, 1984: 37-8).

The cost-benefit analysis approach is sometimes rejected, because it seems to involve the idea of a trade-off. Indeed, it exchanges things that are not commodities such as life, pride, and honor. Nevertheless, such analysis can be useful for Islamic reasoning to some extent. For example, Imam Ja’far Sadiq exercises a cost-benefit (*mafsadat-maslahat*) analysis to rebut Abu Hanifah:

“Then, in order to invalidate ‘analogical reasoning’, the holy Imam mentioned some instances of Islamic legal rulings opposed to this principle. He said, ‘Which one is worse, killing somebody unjustly or committing adultery?’”

“Killing someone unjustly.”
“Now if acting upon analogical reasoning is to be correct, why are two witnesses enough to convict somebody of murder, but four are necessary for convicting somebody of adultery? Is this Islamic ruling in accordance with analogical reasoning?”

“No.”

“Which one is more important, prayer or fasting?”

“Prayer.”

“So why is it incumbent on menstruating women to make up for obligatory fasting, while this is not the case with obligatory prayer? Is this Islamic ruling concurrent with analogical reasoning?”

“No” (‘Ala’i, 2012: 50-1).

By rhetorically asking Abu Hanifah, Imam Ja’far weighs those two worships in the sense of consequentialism but not necessarily a trade-off. Thereby, weighing is also necessary in order to rebut the way Abu Hanifah issued a fatwa which is based on an analogy. Such dialogue teaches us that a consequentialist approach could be exercised in Islam to some extent. If I am right, then taqiyya is one example of such account which is morally allowable under the threat of persecution.

Nowadays, proponents of taqiyya seem to hide their belief on the basis of avoiding social exclusion rather than unjustified persecution. Social exclusion means the state or the process of being denied or being removed from consideration. In ancient Greek, they practiced social exclusion on the basis of popular vote as in the case of the ostracism of Thucydides. Such basis is however problematic because it does not refer to the concept of taqiyya. If this is the case, then they do not actually practice taqiyya.
A constant worry about historical violence could blur a significant distinction between persecution and social exclusion. Such exclusion leads followers to be cautious while living among the majority of either Sunni Muslims or infidels. The idea that ‘social exclusion equals persecution’ is used as a justification for dissimulating their beliefs. This assumes that there is a slippery slope where social exclusion leads ultimately to persecution. But social exclusion refers to denial of privileges, rights and status in a social system as a consequence of his or her identity. If you deny someone for any reason, then you do not necessarily need to persecute him either. So the difference between social exclusion and persecution is clear although they share a similarity. But if the claim of a slippery slope can be rejected and so the practices of *taqiyya* can be seen to violate its concept. This phenomenon is problematic because the reason for *taqiyya* seems to be misused by its proponents. If the discontent of social exclusion is confused with the fear of persecution, then such dissimulation can no longer be considered *taqiyya*.

**Conclusion**

To understand the concept of *taqiyya* involves understanding its connection with the threat of persecution and religious dissimulation. These fundamental components cannot be ignored in practicing *taqiyya*. Indeed, *taqiyya* is conceptually coherent though some practices divert from the concept. The obvious diversion is shifting the notion of persecution by the social exclusion. If this is the case, then such practice is no longer *taqiyya*. Moreover, *taqiyya* violates the Ninth Commandment in the way we comprehend it according to the Old Testament viz., the commandment ‘not to bear false witness.’ On the contrary, *taqiyya* does not violate any moral duty because Muslims comprehend such duty according to the Qur’an, to wit, speaking justly which could be perceived as a positive duty. If my argument is sound, then the deviant practices of *taqiyya* can be compared with the defense tactics of chameleons. Chameleons need not hide themselves since their ability to adjust their
color with their environment is more than enough to protect themselves. If the gap between the concept and the practice remains as it is, then the maxim could be, ‘taqiyya is like a hiding chameleon, the hiding chameleon of my forefathers. They who do not have taqiyya, are not chameleons.’

**ENDNOTES**

1Even LIPI’s (the Indonesian Institute of Sciences) researchers inappropriately attribute the word taqiyya to the NII (the Islamic State of Indonesia) IX. They claim, “If violence could be avoided so far, according to Asep, that is because they realize that their group is too small to fight against the Islamic mainstream. Under this condition, they exercise the taqiyya doctrine which is hiding their actual belief” (Afadlal et. al, 2005: 247). As a consequence, those researchers think that taqiyya is not a specific utilitarian account in the realm of Shi’ism but could also be applied in other school of thoughts (mazhab).

2Debates about the sequence of commandment among Judaism, Catholicism and Christianity are beyond the constraints of this article. The Septuagint, Philo, Talmud and the Reformed Christians agreed to perceive it as the ninth.

3Interestingly, the word ‘dissimulation’ means ‘mudārāt’ while ‘to dissimulate’ means ‘durūghī nimūdan’ in Farsi. Therefore, one could argue that taqiyya contains mudārāt in and of itself though this view is unlikely to be defended in a case like persecution.

4Taqiyya is not equal to hypocrisy for some reasons. Firstly, both ideas contain a different concept. Hypocrisy refers show off about the high standards anything though this is not the case. Moreover, hypocrisy connotes to the inconsistency between deeds and utterances while, in contrast, taqiyya means the religious dissimulation in the face of persecution. Secondly, taqiyya means concealing beliefs and displaying nonbeliefs but otherwise hypocrisy means concealing unbeliefs and declaring faith as be indicated by Al-Baqarah verse 14: “When they meet those who believe, they say: “We believe;” but when they are alone with their evil ones, they say: “We are really with you: we (were) only jesting” (Ali, NY: 3).

5Interestingly, Abdullah Yusuf Ali does not use the word ‘piety’ but rather ‘righteous’ in such verse. He translates as follow: “O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And God has full knowledge and is well-acquainted (with all things)” (Ali, NY: 514). ‘Piety’ is constituted by the
quality of being reverent or religious but ‘righteous’ deals with the moral status or the justifiable conditions of actions or things.

6 Some capital letters are originally given by Hobbes.

7 Campbell conceives kitman to be equal with deception in his later writing (Campbell, 2006b: 5).

8 Here, I should admit that I am neglecting the potentially different meanings in Arabic and English words. But any discussion regarding the problem with these translations would be beyond the scope this article.

9 Robert Nozick mentioned once the notion of self-ownership in his Anarchy, State and Utopia. Then, G. A. Cohen extrapolated it as the fundamental idea of Nozick’s libertarianism. Cohen indeed conceived that the concept of self-ownership is coherent in and of itself though the thesis might be false. Further discussion about self-ownership could be gained from Cohen’s Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality.

10 The existence of Divine Justice (adil) and Imamah (a recognized authority on Islamic theology, law and a spiritual guide) in Shiism are two substantial differences from Sunni. Regarding the Imamah, one might argue that such idea is discriminatory due to its lineage to the Prophet. Nonetheless, such argument is irrelevant because the Shii Imamah is based not only on the lineage but also knowledge and to some degree the bravery to call a resistance against unjust regimes. This bravery indeed implies various sects even within the Shii Muslims such as the Twelver/Itsna Asyariah, the Sevener/Ismailiyah, the Fiver/Zaydi, the Druze, the Nizari/Agha Khani, the Daudi/Bohra, the Hafizi and the other Bohra.

11 Zuhd does not contain an equal meaning compared to asceticism. A further explanation about such distinction could be obtained from Mutahhari’s introduction in Nahjul-Balagha (Mutahhari in Ali, 2009: 112-3).

12 According to Snodgrass, the ostracism is caused by his failure to rescue an Athenian colony called Ampipholis from the invasion of Brasida of Sparta (Snodgrass, 1988: 303).
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