ON THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN AND REGIONAL PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

World philosophies are gradually gaining in recognition. Today, philosophers in Southeast Asia can freely construct their regional philosophies without philosophical tyranny of the West. However, this situation has not come so easily. Many Asian and African philosophies have experienced a struggle for acceptance. And even this recognition is limited by selectivity and philosophical fashion centered in Western academia and perpetuated by Western educated eastern intellectuals. This paper attempts to show how regional philosophy in general and Southeast Asian philosophy in particular can be constructed and accepted. These regional self-constructed philosophies can serve to correct the legacy of the racism and bigotry of the tradition. And the paper also promotes the idea of establishing a philosophical umbrella called ‘Southeast Asian philosophy’ under which regional philosophies can develop and thrive.

Key Words: minor traditions of philosophy; regional philosophy; Southeast Asian philosophy.
Racism and Bigotry in the Western Tradition

Etymologically, philosophy means *love of wisdom*, but what if a lover of wisdom disrespects, overlooks, or belittles traditions other than his own? Can such a philosopher be still a lover of wisdom? In fact, some Western philosophers did adopt a racist standpoint to non-Western philosophical traditions.

David Hume once wrote the footnote to his essay “Of National Characters” (1753), where he remarks that non-whites, particularly negroes, are naturally inferior to the whites.

I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites such as the ancient GERMANS, the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are NEGROE slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In JAMAICA, indeed, they talk of one negro as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.¹
In a similar vein, Hegel had a notion that African people had not yet realized objective existence such as God and Law, and they had not yet attained the knowledge of an absolute Being; they possess a completely wild, untamed, barbarous, unhistorical and undeveloped spirit; they lack thought of reverence and morality—in short, Africans are unhuman and inhuman; thus they have no capacity for philosophizing and theologizing.

In Negro life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet attained to the realization of any substantial objective existence—as for example, God, or Law—in which the interest of man’s volition is involved and in which he realizes his own being. This distinction between himself as an individual and the universality of his essential being, the African in the uniform, undeveloped oneness of his existence has not yet attained; so that the Knowledge of an absolute Being, an Other and a Higher than his individual self, is entirely wanting. The Negro, as already observed, exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state. We must lay aside all thought of reverence and morality—all that we can call feeling—if we would rightly comprehend him; there is nothing harmonious with humanity to be found in this type of character…²

At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical movements in it—that is in its northern part—belong to the Asiatic or European World. Carthage displayed there an important transitionary phase of civilization; but, as a Phoenician colony, it belongs to Asia. Egypt will be considered in reference to the passage of the human mind from its Eastern to its Western phase, but it does not belong to the African Spirit. What we properly understand by Africa, is the Unhistorical, Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented here only as on threshold of the World’s History…³
Many other Western philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell, indirectly suggest the superiority of Western philosophy, when they assert that ‘Philosophy begins with Thales.’ Martin Heidegger in his essay *Was heisst Denken?* (1952), rejected Chinese or Indian philosophy as philosophy because of the absence of the notion of ‘das Seiende in seinem Sein’ (‘the being in its being’), the notion of which, Heidegger asserted, is typically European. Heidegger writes:

So gelangt denn im Bereich dieser Zwiefalt zum Vorschein, was allein hier zu befragen bleibt: was ist das Seiende in seinem Sein? Der Stil der gesamten abendländisch europäischen Philosophie — es gibt keine andere, weder eine chinesische noch eine indische — ist von der Zwiefalt »Seiendes — seiend« her bestimmt. Ihr Vorgehen im Bereich der Zwiefalt ist maßgebend von der Auslegung geprägt, die Piaton dieser Zwiefalt gegeben hat. Daß sie als Teilhabe erscheint, ist in keener Weise selbstverständlich.⁴

According to Aawani (2002), these Western philosophers dismissive views about the other philosophical traditions have their root in Aristotle’s later opinion about the origin of philosophy. Previously, Aristotle entertained a similar opinion to his teacher Plato, that the Persian Magians had precedence over the Egyptians in philosophy; however, later in the *Metaphysics*, he began to assert that philosophy was essentially of Greek origin (Aawani 2002:192).

**The Non-Western Responses**

There are four kinds of responses made by non-Western philosophers to Western philosophers’ racism or bigotry: unveiling their racism in their academic writing, re-writing a history of Western philosophy, creating a two-way flow in the passage of ideas between Eastern philosophers and
Western philosophers, and lastly, heightening Western philosophers’ awareness that they had so far been developing misosophy rather than philosophy.

The African philosopher Olufemi Taiwo unveils Western Hegel’s racism, in his essay “Exorcising Hegel’s Ghost: Africa’s Challenge to Philosophy” (1998). He believed that this unveiling is important so that Hegel’s philosophical descendants will in the future ‘go better than their ancestor’, and will not maintain the ungrounded racism (Taiwo 1998:11). If these biases are unrecognized, peculiar exclusion of Africa from the discourse of philosophy constructed by tradition of historiography of Western philosophy will always be present (Taiwo 1998:1-2).

Secondly, an Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi (born 1934) re-wrote a history of Western philosophy in his *Muqaddimah fi ‘Ilm al-İstighrâb* (English, *Introduction to Occidentalism*) (2000). He believes Western philosophers’ racism can be corrected by re-viewing the history of Western philosophy through a non-Western’s eye and by revealing the hidden non-Western cultural raw materials which contributed to the formation of the Western philosophical tradition. In his opinion, Western philosophers ignore or deliberately hide any Eastern philosophical influences on Western philosophy so as to maintain its supremacy over the East and even to conceal the West’s cultural inferiority to the East (Hanafi 2000:153-154). By disclosing the ancient Afroasiatic cultural heritage—such as Chinese, Indian, Persian, Mesopotamian, Canaanite, African as well as Muslim—and the pre-Christian native European heritage (like Teutonic, Viking, Vandalic, Frankish, Anglo-saxon, etc.) which help shape today’s Western cultural consciousness, the Western philosophers’ triumphalism can be diminished (Hanafi 2000:154-170).

Thirdly, a Singaporean thinker and statesman Kishore Mahbubani (born 1948) contended in his *Can Asians Think?: Understanding The Divide Between East and West* (1998) that non-Westerners had lived in an essentially unbalanced world; the flow of ideas, reflecting five hundred years of Western domination of the globe, remains a one-way street: from the West to the East. Ironically, most Westerners are blind
to the fact that they have arrogated to themselves the moral high ground from which they triumphantly lecture the world, whereas the rest of the world can see this clearly (Mahbubani 2002:10). To burst the bubble of moral pretentiousness that had enveloped the Western intellectual universe since the period of Western triumphalism that followed the end of the Cold War, a two-way flow in the passage of ideas between Eastern and Western thinkers must be created, challenging the prevailing Western ideas, such as democracy, human rights, freedom of the press, capitalism, etc. (Mahbubani 2002:12-15). This two-way flow of ideas, consequently, will prevent the Western mind from assuming that Western civilization represents the only universal civilization and will make them ‘conceive of the possibility that the Western mind may also be limited in its own way.’ (Mahbubani 2002:11). What Mahbubani had done is not something new, before him, a Chinese modern intellectual Liang Qichao (1873-1929) had reflected on the corruptions of American democracy and capitalism in an academic manner (Mishra 2012:419).

Finally, an Iranian philosopher Seyyed Hossein Nasr (born 1933) contended that Western philosophy has in fact been developing a misosophy or antisophy rather than philosophy in his masterpiece, Knowledge and the Sacred (Nasr 1989:35). Beginning with the time of Hegel and Karl Marx and extending through Auguste Comte and Rudolf Carnap, Western philosophers had secularized and desacralized philosophy or wisdom — that is, the wisdom they had for so long embraced in the era of Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, the Church Fathers, the Christian Neoplatonists throughout the era of Reformation philosophers to the one of Renaissance philosophers (Nasr 1989:14-33); through this desacralization, modern philosophers have since developed misosophy (the hatred of wisdom) or antisophy (the opposition to wisdom). To re-embrace philosophy in its true sense, the modern philosophers must re-sacralize and re-collect their ancient wisdom, the wisdom of which originated mostly from the Eastern world; ‘where knowledge has never become divorced from the sacred.’ (Nasr 1989:4).
The Western ‘Apology’

Criticisms aimed at the racism of Western philosophers have slowly made them realize that the philosophical tradition not only belongs to them but also to the other races and cultures. Western universities now have opened their doors for more intensive study of Eastern, Asian, or world philosophy. Some Western writers like Robert Bernasconi & Sybol Cook (2003) and Peter K.J. Park (2013) had finally revealed how racist Western philosophers were to non-Western philosophers, while some others, such as Will Durant (1954), Martin Bernal (1987), John M. Hobson (2004), and David Weir (2011) had crossed the Eurocentric line by writing books unveiling the world contribution to the establishment of Western civilization.

There are various sub-disciplines of philosophy through which the attempt to accommodate non-Western traditions is conducted. These attempts can be placed into three categories: works in ‘The Encyclopedia of Philosophy’, works in ‘Asian Philosophy’, and works in ‘World Philosophy’.

First of all, in the The Encyclopedia of Philosophy edited by Paul Edwards (1967), Western writers have shown their appreciation of the world philosophy by publishing articles of one Egyptian philosopher, one Iranian philosopher, one Pakistani philosopher, and four Chinese philosophers. Edward Craig (1998), author of Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and Robert L. Arrington (1999), author of A Companion to the Philosophers, have also included philosophies of East Asia (Japan, China, Korea, among others) and of South Asia (India, Pakistan, etc.) in their works.

Secondly, in the works concerning Asian Philosophy, writers have elaborated upon Asian philosophies such as Arab/Muslim philosophy, Iranian/Persian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy, Japanese philosophy, Korean philosophy, in their books. By way of illustration, Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy by Brian Carr & Indira Mahalingam (1997) includes entries on Persian philosophy, Indian

Concerning works in *World Philosophy*, Western writers have recently included ‘minor traditions of philosophy’ such as Navaho Indian philosophy, Polynesian philosophy, and Mexican philosophy. To illustrate, *Ideological Differences and World Order: Studies in the Philosophy and Science of the World’s Cultures* by F.S.C. Northrop (1949) provided a forum for philosophers of Navaho, Latin Americans, and France, among others, to discuss their philosophies, whereas Eliot Deutsch & Ron Bontekoe, authors of *A Companion to World Philosophies* (1999), include articles on Polynesian philosophy and African philosophy in addition to ‘major traditions of philosophy’ such as Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Buddhist, and Islamic philosophies. In the same vein, A. Pablo Iannone in his *Dictionary of World Philosophy* (2001) includes contributions of Native America, Bologna, Paris, Bantu, Barcelona, Nahua, Maori, and Madrid.

Most of these sub-disciplines of philosophy in the Western academic world are increasingly giving some recognition to non-Western philosophies.

**The Continued Struggle of Minor Traditions**

But despite this increasing recognition and apologetics Eastern philosophers still suffer from discrimination against their philosophies, particularly those of regional and ‘minor traditions of Asian philosophy’; all the three Western literary traditions aforementioned feature restricted selectivity when treating the minor traditions. By way of illustration, Oliver Leaman in ‘Introduction’ of his *Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy*, explicitly stated ‘... it would be interesting to have a reference work which looked at some of the most important thinkers and ideas in Asian
philosophy.’ (Leaman 2001:viii). This implies that the philosophers or the ideas he did not include in his work — that is to say, the minor traditions of Asian philosophy — are deemed low in importance. This is very likely to confirm what Finngeir Hiorth had noted that Southeast Asia was a part of the world of lesser importance to Western professional philosophers due to weak tradition of philosophy in those countries (Hiorth 1983:2).

In literary tradition of *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, for instance, standard Western philosophical literature such as Paul Edwards’s (1967), Edward Craig’s (1998), Robert L. Arrington’s (1999) only discusses the major philosophical traditions of East Asia and South Asia; it excludes minor traditions of Central Asia, let alone of Southeast Asia. The tradition of *Asian Philosophy* has also ignored the minor traditions. For example, philosophies of Tibet, Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, or Indonesia, have not received any mention in the Western standard philosophical literature like St. Elmo Nauman’s (1978), Brian Carr & Indira Mahalingam’s (1997), Joel J. Kupperman’s *Classic Asian Philosophy* (2001) and *Learning from AsianPhilosophy* (1999). This is also the case in the works of *World Philosophy*, exemplified by the works of F.S.C. Northrop (1949), Eliot Deutsch & Ron Bontekoe (1999), Ben-Ami Scharfstein’s *A Comparative History of World Philosophy: From the Upanishads to Kant* (1998), H. Gene Blocker’s *World Philosophy: an East-West Comparative Introduction to Philosophy* (1999), and Robert L. Arrington’s *World’s Great Philosophers* (2003). They only recognize the major traditions of Chinese, Indian, and Japanese philosophy; none of them recognize the importance of minor traditions.7

In actual fact, Western academia’s reluctance to acknowledge the minor traditions of Asian philosophy is mirrored by Eastern academia’s unwillingness to do so to the minor traditions of Western philosophy, such as of Lithuania, Italy, Poland, Czech, Bulgaria, Georgia, Yugoslavia, Romania, or Hungary. However, the Western academia’s reluctance exerts more harmful impact than its fellow Easterners’ oversights. The Western academic world spreads its agents throughout all parts of the world by
way of the graduates of Western universities, and casts its spell of Western academic superiority through them. It does this in various ways: by its established departments of philosophy in its famous universities, its established professorship which uses its power to anoint certain traditions of Asian philosophy as being worthy to be studied, its standardized textbooks with its inclusions and exclusions, its alumni who perpetuate its misunderstandings, and the power and money which gives certain ways of thinking legitimacy. As a direct consequence of this Western academic hegemony, a group of ‘elitists’ are established in non-Western parts of the world, who believe all products of Western academia are far superior to those produced in their own countries. As a result, the minor traditions of world philosophy are not given a voice in any academic discourse in non-Western universities. But occasionally some minor tradition gains recognition. Sometimes a certain philosophy becomes popularized. This is in fact what happened to African philosophy, Korean philosophy, Tibetan philosophy, Melanesian philosophy, Polynesian philosophy, among others. All the mentioned philosophies had not been previously accepted by the Western academic world, yet, once the West realizes their philosophical importance, they became fashionable, and academics blindly accept their significance.

The Emergence of Regional Philosophies

It is the elitist epistemic hegemony, conventionalizing the Western view of Asian philosophy with only the major traditions of Indian, Chinese, and Japanese philosophies, that makes many philosophers from minor traditions upset. Rolando M. Gripaldo stated that ‘the onslaught of Oriental and Western philosophies in the Philippines has marginalized Filipino philosophy.’ (Gripaldo 2003:1). To him, it is high time for Filipino philosophy to be a specific philosophy making its way through the thick cloud of Filipino academic unknowing. This opinion is shared by other Southeast Asian philosophers like Soraj Hongladarom (1996), Ferry Hidayat (2005), and Pham Van Duc (2008). Soraj Hongladarom believes
that Thai philosophy as a definite philosophy is important for Thai people so as to ‘surge forward and remain responsive to the changes brought about by world conditions’, to make them ‘alert, active and responsive to change’ (Hongladarom 1996:2). Also, Thai philosophy is an important tool for Thai community ‘to revitalize itself, to turn back upon itself so that it would not become redundant amidst the rapidly changing world.’ (Hongladarom 1996:5). Ferry Hidayat, by the same token, contended that the emergence of Indonesian philosophy as a particular philosophy was significant so as to discover phenomenon of thinking tradition in Indonesia and to foster a sense of pride amidst international academic competition (Hidayat 2005a:2). Likewise, Pham Van Duc maintained that the appearance of Vietnamese philosophy as a separate philosophy was rich in significance because of four reasons: 1). It articulates differences between Vietnamese, Chinese, and Indian philosophies that seems *prima facie* to be similar; 2). It restores Vietnamese past philosophical thoughts; 3). It clarifies their positive meanings and values for the life of Vietnam and its people today; and 4). It preserves national cultural identity in the present context of globalization (Duc 2008:6-7).

All the Southeast Asians mentioned above find it important to put their regional philosophies forward in order to positively contribute to the tradition of Asian philosophy. They do not have to wait until Western academia’s recognition approves or until their elitist fellow countrymen’ acknowledgement comes; they establish their regional philosophies so that the spell of epistemic hegemony is broken. Their shared struggle is to make their minor traditions of philosophy equal to the major traditions that had highly developed before, to take up a respectful position, to achieve high status, and to play a prominent role in the advancement of the prevailing Asian philosophy.

A considerable advantage that can be gained with this regional philosophical enterprise is that it can contribute to the enrichment of Asian philosophy by popularizing regional philosophers that have not been popular or merely popularized through the medium of Western academia. By establishing Filipino philosophy, for instance, Rolando M. Gripaldo
can popularize Filipino philosophers such as Jose Rizal, Andres Bonifacio, and Emilio Jacinto, amongst others (Gripaldo 2003:1). The founding of Thai philosophy by Soraj Hongladarom perfectly enables him to set the stage for Thai philosophers like Sulak Sivaraksa and Phra Dhammapidok (aka Prayudh Prayutto), and of course Soraj Hongladarom himself, to be well-known to the world (Hongladarom 1998:97). The establishment of Indonesian philosophy by its popularizer Ferry Hidayat makes popularization of Indonesian philosophers such as Mpu Tantular, Mpu Kanwa, Mpu Panuluh, Syeikh Siti Jenar (2015)—besides the world-renowned logician Dharmakirti—possible.

The Future Agenda

Once all the important philosophers of all the regional philosophies emerging in Southeast Asia had achieved recognition and the support of their institutional and national sponsorships, what could be done next? The answer would be the establishment of a network of Southeast Asian philosophy. A.B. Shamsul said in his invitation to the Inter-Southeast Asian study of Southeast Asia:

For a long time, students and scholars from Southeast Asia studied and learnt about the region not from one another directly but rather in an indirect manner, from the experts located at the various Centres of Southeast Asian Studies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Australia. Very rarely, a Malaysian would enroll as a graduate student at Universitas Indonesia to study about Indonesian history, or at Chulalongkorn University to study Thailand’s bureaucracy, or at the University of the Philippines to study Philippine society and culture. The Malaysian would usually end up either at Cornell University, or the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London or Monash University in Australia as a graduate
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student. The question is why don’t Southeast Asians learn and study about Southeast Asia from one another? (Shamsul 2007:140)

Shamsul’s invitation must be herein understood not only as the establishment of an Inter-Asia Cultural Studies but also to that of Southeast Asian philosophy. There are four reasons why its construction is imperative. First, to be soon well-acknowledged as one of the major tradition of Asian philosophy, the regional philosophies should be united under one philosophical umbrella and cooperate each other so that all the regional philosophies equally have a high standing in the world of philosophy. Second, the construction of Southeast Asian philosophy will consequently encourage each country in Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar [Burma], the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) to construct her regional philosophy as a distinct academic study, then to develop it, and finally to popularize her philosophers through it. When one region has troubles setting up its philosophy, another region can lend a hand. Also, each region of Southeast Asia can help each other in how to best formulate the subject-matter of the philosophical study. For example, Rolando M. Gripaldo’s ‘three approaches’ (traditional/philosophical, cultural, and nationality/constitutional) (Gripaldo 2012:2-3) and Soraj Hongladarom’s comparison between ‘Thai Area Study’ and ‘Thai Philosophy’ to clarify a demarcation line between the two (Hongladarom 1996:1), Pham Van Duc’s three key orientations in philosophical research (Duc 2008:1), and Ferry Hidayat’s e-book *Pengantar Menuju Filsafat Indonesia* (English, *Introduction to Indonesian Philosophy*) (2005b) can inspire philosophers of the other Southeast Asian countries in developing their approaches. Third, as an adage says ‘only Asians can best understand Asians’, the establishment of Southeast Asian philosophy will ward off materialistic modernist Western bias and misunderstanding over the still-spiritual Southeast Asia. Finally, ending the West’s philosophical racism, philosophical desacralization, and philosophical academic selectivity towards the minor traditions of world
philosophy, which include Southeast Asian philosophy, is its *mission sacrée*. The dream of philosophers in many parts of the world today, is to work in equal standing with all other wisdom traditions; it is only in this way that the word *philosophy* as the true love of wisdom (a wisdom not only of the major but also the minor traditions) can maintain its true meaning.

**ENDNOTES**


7 Due to the most recent information technology, the minor traditions of philosophy find their way to be popular online. Two most important Western institutions to propagate the minor philosophies duly mentioned herein are *Wikipedia* and George F. McLean’s *Council for Research in Values and Philosophy* (CRVP). Visit his website at www.crvp.org.

8 What is meant by ‘elitist’ herein is a non-Western philosopher graduating from philosophy department of Western university, who blindly holds her/his Western professors’ view of Western supremacy of philosophy. On the other hand, there is an ‘egalitarian’, who means a non-Western philosopher graduating from philosophy department of either Western or Eastern university, who holds her/his critical view that all kinds of philosophy in the world (including the Western) are of very equal importance as enrichment of her/his wisdom.

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