SĀṆKHYA TEACHINGS FOUND IN THERAVADA
BUDDHISM: AN INQUIRY INTO AN ANALOGY DEPICTED
IN THE VISUDDHIMAGGA

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ABSTRACT

In the study of philosophies in religions, occasionally, parallel concepts among the religions are also found. For that reason, to understand the original form and precise-doctrine of the religions, it is essential to study their history too. The analogy “blind and lame” found in the Visuddhimagga was applied by Buddhaghosa to explain the teaching of Dependent Origination. The same analogy was utilized by Iśvara Kṛṣṇa to explain the interrelationship between Prakṛti and Puruṣa in Sāṅkhya Kārikā. In consequence, a doubt arises whether the Theravada Buddhist texts were shaded by non-Buddhist systems accepted soul theory. Also, this doubt leads to misunderstand that the teachings of the Dependent and Origination and Prakṛti and Puruṣa are identical. Nevertheless, examining the historical records related to these two different religious texts and their traditions, it is obvious that they were different teachings in different contexts. So, this article aims to corroborate the variations of them with reference to the history of religions: Buddhism and Sāṅkhya.

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Introduction

The grand commentary of Pali literature, the *Visuddhimagga*, was compiled by Buddhaghosa in Ceylon in the 5th century AD. Basing itself on the *Tipiṭaka*, it attempts to systemize the essential teachings of the Theravada tradition. Buddhaghosa had to deduce certain sources, which were not admitted by *Mahāvihāra* monks.\(^1\) It indicates that his writing was thoroughly supervised and evaluated by *Mahāvihāra* monks. Nevertheless, it is apparent that some illustrations which come to light in the Vism are similar to those found in Buddhist Sanskrit texts.\(^2\) It is presumable that the Vism might be influenced by the *Sāṅkhya* system too. For instance, the following analogy found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*\(^3\) is also found in the Vism:

> “Tattha jaccandhopi nittejo dubbalo na sakena tejena sakena balena gacchati, pīṭhasappīpi nittejo dubbalo na sakena tejena sakenabalena gacchati, na ca tesam aṇṇamaṇṇaṃ nissāya gamanaṃ nappavattati, evam evam nāmampi nittejaṃ na sakena tejena uppajjati,”\(^4\)[Here, the blind man is also inefficient and powerless, does not move with his own efficacy and power, the lame man is also inefficient and powerless, does not move with his own efficacy and power, in the absence of their mutual co-operation walking does not come to be, thus, Name is also inefficient and powerless, does not move with its own efficacy and power, Form is also inefficient and powerless, does not move with its own efficacy and power].

Apart from the above analogy, three commentaries, (the Vism, the *Paṭisambhidāmagga-āṭṭhakathā* and the *Sammohavinodanī*) clearly criticize the doctrine of *Sāṅkhya* by corroborating that ‘Avijjā’ is not the primordial entity of the world.\(^5\) Besides, defining ‘emptiness’, the Vism, repeatedly rejects *Sāṅkhya* teaching linked to Dependent Origination.\(^6\)
Yet, Buddhaghosa takes in the analogy ‘blind and lame’ incorporated even in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* in his great Pali work, without any ambivalence. In this article, I will attempt to break through the background of how the *Sāṅkhya* teachings influenced the Vism with special reference to the analogy of ‘blind and lame.’

**Early Buddhist Aspect of the Analogy**

The ‘epistemology’ involved is the way of gaining knowledge in regard to the world and being. The variability of the ‘theory of knowledge’ appears in relation to the forms of the final emancipation. Thus, Buddhism admits perception (including extraordinary perception) and inference to be the epistemological means of gaining knowledge. It is to say that some disagreements among present scholars are set up with regard to the inferences discussed in Buddhist literature. In the *Nikāya* texts, the term ‘anumāna’ and ‘anvayañāna’ are employed in the sense of inference. Buddhist inference appeared as a correlated concept in terms of Dependent Origination. In this regard, Jayatilake suggests that the Buddhist inference is based on the ordinary and extraordinary perceptions. Hence, it is clear that this suggestion generalizes the prevalence of inference in early Buddhist teaching. Accordingly, the analogy can be defined as the technical part of the inference. In consequence, obviously Buddhism also applied analogies in the way of epistemology.

**The Analogy ‘Blind and Lame’ in the Visuddhimagga**

Illustrating the interdependence of Name and Form, Buddhaghosa adopts the analogy of ‘blind and lame’ in the *Diṭṭhivisuddhi-niddesa* of the Vism. This analogy leads to the view that the Name does not exist without Form and vice versa. Though the aim of using this analogy was to explain Buddhist doctrine, herein, Buddhaghosa had borrowed it from the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. Regarding this identical feature in both Vism and *Sāṅkhya*, I intend to draw four different postulates as follows.
1. Buddhaghosa was influenced by Śāṅkhya system directly.
2. Śāṅkhya was influenced by Buddhism.
3. This was not a mistake done by Buddhaghosa. He simply followed the elders’ sources only.
4. The likeness of the analogy used in the Vism and the Śāṅkhya Kārikā is demonstrable in the sense of epistemology only, not incontext.

**Relationship between Buddhaghosa and Śāṅkhya system**

The strong Brahmanical background of Buddhaghosa inherited by birth signifies a possibility of Śāṅkhya philosophy influencing his works. Particularly, as the Mahāvaṃsa and the Buddhaghosuppatti have recorded, Buddhaghosa studied Brahmanic teachings and developed mastery in three Veda-s in his teen years. Moreover, the history of the birth of Buddhagosa (Buddhaghosuppatti) explicitly gives an account that Buddhaghosa was from a Brahmin family that both Kesi and his son Ghosa were well-versed in three Veda-s. On the other hand, Buddhaghosa, before his leaving for Ceylon, made an effort to convert his father to be a Buddhist and succeeded. The effort he made to convert his father also indicates how strong his father as a Brahmin was. However, Kosambi Dhammānanda traces a divergent suggestion to the facts found in the Mahāvaṃsa and the Buddhaghosuppatti. He emphasizes that Buddhaghosa was not a Brahmin. The attestation brought to prove his suggestion was that Buddhaghosa demonstrated unawareness in explaining the doctrine and culture of Brahmanism in India. Prof. Abeynayake logically overrules the opinion given by Kosambi Dammānanda and corroborates that Buddhaghosa did not think to practise further as a Brahmin since he had been trained in the Buddhist Order.

Venerable Revata, the teacher of Buddhaghosa, was a great Theravadamonk and there is no dependable clue to conclude that Buddhaghosa inserted Brahmanical teachings in his works completed while he was in
India. On the other hand, it can be inferred that venerable Revata, after recognizing the non-Buddhist influence in Buddhaghosa’s works, advised to arrive in Ceylon and translate the Commentaries existed in Sinhalese as an assessment to rectify his understanding in another way. But, there are insufficient facts to support corroborating the above inference.

**Likely Buddhist Influence on Sāṅkhya**

The second attempt is to inquire whether this analogy appeared as an outcome of Buddhist influence towards the Sāṅkhya system. The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* contains a few analogies which are parallel to Pali Post Canonical and Commentarial literature. Even so, the analogy ‘lame and blind’ in the Vism cannot be found in the Pali Canonical or Post Canonical literature and in consequence, this analogy can be counted as a teaching borrowed from Sāṅkhya. Accordingly, the *Nettippakaraṇa* incorporates the analogy milk and curd, which is more familiar with Sāṅkhya teachings. Nevertheless, the *Nettippakaraṇa* falls under the category of the Post Canonical literature and is dated to the 1st century BCE. In a further inquiry on the *Nettippakaraṇa*, Norman suggests that it was compiled in North-India. As he says, the *Arya* meter which was familiar to Vedic texts have been employed in the *Nettippakaraṇa* and this text often was used by Buddhaghosain his works. If his assumption is accurate, inevitably, the author of the *Nettippakaraṇa* also was inclined to Brahmanic teachings like Sāṅkhya.

Besides, the historical facts revealed in the Pali literature connected to the Sāṅkhya also support this postulate. Unanimously, scholars accept that the founder of Sāṅkhya was the seer Kapila. Kapila is recognized as an independent seer and also a representative of the Godhead. No doubt, this difference damages the claim that Kapila obtained a great reputation as an outstanding philosopher. In any case, the correlation between Sāṅkhya and Upaniṣad is irrefutable because the two Upaniṣad texts give accounts of the seer Kapila, especially in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. Moreover, the Bhagavad-Gita and the Mahabharata refer to the term Sāṅkhya.
Muller finds, the classical *Upaniṣad* refer only to two names of Indian philosophical systems; *Sāṅkhya* and Yoga. These factors signify that Kapila the founder of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy has to be stratified into early strata of the *Upaniṣad* (before the composition of the *Bhagavad-Gita*, the *Mahabharata* and the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*.) Yet, it should be noted here that the name Kapila is not unique to *Sāṅkhya* or Hindu philosophy. The *Uttarajjhaya*, one of four Mūla texts of the Jain Canon, also gives details with reference to Kapila, who attained Pacceka-Buddha hood. And, the Buddhist literature also holds a sizeable account of seer Kapila. Particularly, the Buddhist history records about two Kapilas. Therein, Kapila encountered in the *Sutta-nipāta* was an evil person. But, referring to the commentaries, the next Kapila could be recognized as a great seer, who practised hard practices and later on sacrificed his own monastery and the region to build the city *Kapilavatthu*. The *Saundarānanda* also affirms that Kapila was a great seer and he dedicated his territory to build *Kapilavasthu*. If the commentary of the *Sutta-nipāta* is acceptable the Kapila found in this commentary could be the same person, who set up the *Sāṅkhya* system. Also, it would be the most historical evidence in terms of seer Kapila or the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy in both Pali and Sanskrit literature and as such *Sāṅkhya* could be considered as more antique than Buddhism. The critical note on *Sāṅkhya* teachings found in the *Pañcappakaraṇa-anu-ṭīkā* would be vital source leading to clear evidence regarding this discussion. In this sub-commentary, venerable Ānanada also pointed out that Kapila was a seer who founded the *Sāṅkhya* teachings. As modern scholars claim, the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* written by Ishvara Kṛṣṇa would be better considered as the most historical text in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. Accordingly, I presume by referring to the attestations of the *Mahabharata*, the *Bhagavad-Gita* and the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* that the *Sāṅkhya* teaching was found by Kapila between 7th century and the 5th century BCE.

The statement, “*pakati kho esā, kassapa, lokasmiṃ ‘dukkaraṃ sāmaññaṃ dukkaraṃ brahmañña’*,34 found in the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* is another controversial reference to consider seriously. Maurice Walshe
translates the term ‘pakati’ (prakṛti?); “so they say in the world.”35 It is observed that he evades this term ‘pakati’ without giving a direct translation. The commentary of the Dīgha-nikāya defines the term ‘pakati’ as a kind of teaching.36 Moreover, the Dīgha-nikāya-ṭīkā illustrates the term ‘pakati’ (prakṛti?) to be “lokasiddhavāda.”37 As Pali sub-commentarial literature explains, “loka-siddhavāda” can be defined in three contexts. Firstly, it seems to be a way of functions related to nature.38 The other meaning is connected to the teaching of epistemology. Particularly, defining the term “yathā nāmā,” the Majjhima-nikāya-ṭīkā, notes “to demonstrate that this is the reality, comprehending after analyzed the objects what not analyzed is called yathā nāmā.”39 The third context is the practice followed by non-Buddhist ascetics.40 So, herein the last two contexts are identical in both theoretically and pragmatically. The teaching of Mahāsīhanāda-sutta is familiar with the third explanation. In this respect, I understand the term “loka-siddhavāda” in the sub-commentarial literature leads to a religious teaching. Probably, that could be Sāṅkhya. Apparently, it can be assumed that the term “loka-siddhavāda” depicted in the sub-commentaries in the context of epistemology means “the teachings of origin or form of the world.” As Yoga teachings believe, “loka siddha” is a practitioner, who attained all yogic accomplishment.41 Therefore, it is possible to accept that “loka-siddhavada” signifies the teaching of Sāṅkhya because Sāṅkhya and Yoga are inseparable. After considering all the facts, it has to be accepted that by explaining “pakati” the ṭīkā literature refer to Sāṅkhya. Thus, if the interpretations come to light in the ṭīkā-s are acceptable, beyond a doubt, it should be admitted that even in Buddha’s time, the Sāṅkhya, which accepts primordial entities, was existent. Accordingly, a hypothesis can be traced whether the antiquity of Sāṅkhya was the cause to insert this analogy into the Vism. But, the Mahāsīhanāda-sutta contains the term “pakati” in the sense of nature, common or universal characteristic only. The illustrations of commentators are insufficient to say that the Mahāsīhanāda-sutta indicates any clue regarding this discussion. And, it should be remembered that though we accept that the Mahāsīhanāda-sutta refers to Sāṅkhya system, the sutta itself demonstrates that the Buddha kept it away (pakati) pointing out its futility.
Further accounts that the Sāṅkhya system existed in Buddha’s time are implied in the Mūlapariyāya-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya. The first evidence on this subject is found in the introductory note given by Bhikkhu Thanissara in his translation of the Mūlapariyāya-sutta. As he has discussed, the history of Sāṅkhya system extends back to the time of Uddaka and it developed up to the classical stage at the time of the Buddha. Bhikkhu Thanissara claims that the listeners of this sutta were mastered in Sāṅkhya. Consequently, because the Buddha’s explanation was not equal to the views they already held, they were displeased with this discourse.

In a further inquiry into its commentary, facts may be found which partly advocate the aforementioned suggestion. The listeners were Brahmans, and this sutta was delivered in the form of arisen needs (aṭṭhuppattika). Moreover, the sutta notes that the Buddha intended to elaborate “the root causes of all the dhamma-s” (sabbadhamma mūlapariyāya). Especially, this teaching leads to substantiate non-self [(he does) not conceive Nibbāna, in Nibbāna, from Nibbāna or Nibbāna as mine]. It indicates the listeners held a conceit on the ultimate truth and Buddha wanted to get rid of their conceit completely. Notably, Sāṅkhya also admitted theory of evolution except mūla prakṛti. In other words, Sāṅkhya does not accept non-self in relation to the ultimate truth (puruṣa). So, did the Buddha try to make these Brahmans understand, who held views that the ultimate truth is eternal, by delivering this sutta that there is no self even in Nibbāna? However the followers were not pleased with the explanation given by the Buddha. This postulate tends to agree with the suggestion made by Bhikkhu Thanissara. Nevertheless, the information provided in the commentary is that these followers were full of conceit in terms of their knowledge of Buddhism and the Buddha delivered this sutta to demolish their conceit. The same accounts that the commentary has given are found in the Mūlapariyāya-Jātaka too. Seemingly, the aim of delivering the sutta, as the commentary notes, runs counter to the Bhikkhu Thanissara’s suggestion. In this respect, it is difficult to come to a precise conclusion regarding this assumption. As I understand, without an awareness of the geographical background of the history of Sāṅkhya, it is difficult
to affirm the above argument. In other words, if we have dependable facts that the city *Ukkatthā*, where the Buddha delivered this sutta was a territory for *Sāṅkhya* followers, it could be accepted that the listeners of this sutta were *Sāṅkhya* followers. Accordingly, the second hypothesis I posited should be overruled due to its lack of evidence.

**Multiplicity of Sources**

In line with the third point, I assume that the Vism was not merely an independent treatise and it was guided by the Vimuttimagga (Vim). But, popular opinion is that in compiling the Vism, Buddhagosa applied the old Sinhalese commentaries accepted by Mahāvihārans only. Consequently, still, there is no explicit agreement among the Pali Buddhist scholars that Buddhaghosa followed the Vim in compiling the Vism. To this point, Bapat notes;

“And so, the only theory that seems to us as most probable, is the theory, no 1: That Buddhaghosa had Upatissa’s book, Vimuttimagga, before him and that he, taking the framework of the Upatissa’s Vimuttimagga, simplified it with his scholastic erudition and composed his work Visuddhimagga, which has certainly far outshone Upatissa’s Vimuttimagga.”46

As he points out, the Vism was structured as the Vim. Malalasekara also remarks in this regard, “There is, I feel, no need to conclude, therefore, that “the Visuddhimagga, which has been considered to be entirely Buddhaghosa’s own work is in reality a revised version of Upatissa’s Vimuttimagga”.47 In this respect, he also partly agrees to admit that the Vim influenced the Vism. In this discussion, Hinuber suggests that the Vim was earlier than Vism and later than the commentary of the *Paṭisambhidā*.48 To the same point, Norman advocates that the Vim took the reins to the Vism.49 Accordingly, it is clear that the Vism was structured
in the shade of the Vim. In fact, this analogy is found in the Vim. As modern scholars assume, the author of the Vim is encountered in the list of the lineage of the Theras. Also, he was living in North India, while he was composing the Vim. To the above evidence, he was an elder of Theravada lineage and the text was composed in India. Thus, it is possible to influence contemporary Sanskrit or Brahmanic literary features towards the Vim. As the outcome of following the Vim, the analogy ‘blind and lame’ may have been incorporated in the Vism. Accordingly, if we accept that compiling the commentaries, Buddhaghosa was interested in using trustworthy sources beyond elders’ notes, it is not difficult to admit that this analogy also was borrowed by him from the Vim.

**Contextual Diversity**

The fourth postulate is that Buddhaghosa borrowed some analogies from Sāṅkhya to substantiate Buddhist teachings. In connection with it, he intended to use the analogy ‘blind and lame’ in the sense of epistemology because it was an ideal analogy to describe Dependent Origination. Especially, in accordance to Sāṅkhya, Puruṣa is defined to be the psychological part and Prakṛti is the physical part. Prakṛti cannot move ahead just as the cripple cannot walk alone. The Puruṣa does not function independently just as the blind man cannot see, but can walk. Further, it is equal to a charioteer without a chariot and a chariot without a charioteer. This simile was applied by Buddhaghosa to explain the interrelationship between Name and Form. In applying the analogy which comes in Sāṅkhya Kārikā to the context deliberated in the Vism; the Name (nāma), similar to the concept Puruṣa in Saṅkya like a blind man. As Sāṅkhya interprets, the Puruṣa is the primordial principle. Yet, the Vism has not defined either Name or Form to be primordial. In the same passage, Buddhaghosa, having cited the Nalakalāpa-sutta, substantiates that both Name and Form are interrelated. In addition to that, the Sāṅkhya accepts that the causation is allowed for Prakṛti only. In this manner, if Buddhaghosa
imitated outright the *Sāṅkhya*, he would have symbolized that causation is rendered in matter only. But, Buddhaghosa’s way of explaining was completely different in the context than the teachings of *Sāṅkhya*.

**Conclusion**

*Sāṅkhya* philosophy manifests a few similarities with Buddhism by accepting the concept of suffering. Besides, analyzing the analogy ‘lame and blind’ found in the Vism, it is difficult to say unanimously that Buddhaghosa absorbed the teachings of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. In this regard the first hypothesis I traced should be avoided. Undoubtedly, Buddhaghosa had mastery of Brahmanism. But the evidence is not adequate to prove that the life of the Buddhaghosa was influenced by *Sāṅkhya*. Also, it is impossible to corroborate that Buddhism influenced *Sāṅkhya*.

As I understand, this analogy in the Vism was the result of following the Vim, which was composed in North-India where the Brahmanic teachings critically spread. Upatissa, the author of the Vim, was an Indian monk, and entered to the Buddhist Order from a Brahmin family. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that he thrived with traditional Brahmanical knowledge and he utilized the analogy to explain Buddhist doctrine. Also, both Buddhaghosa and Upatissa were from Brahmin families and were familiar with this analogy. However, it is not difficult to accept that Upatissa borrowed this analogy from the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* This is because he had more freedom in compiling the commentaries than Buddhaghosa, who had to adhere to the rules introduced by *Mahāvihāra* monks. But, Hinuber suggests that the Vim also used the Theravada *Tipiṭaka*. Finally, it should be noted that even though Buddhaghosa cited the analogy, explicitly it can be substantiated that Buddhaghosa used the analogy which is found in *Sāṅkhya* merely in a structural manner. He had no intention to absorb or follow the doctrine of *Sāṅkhya* in the context.
“He also mentions the Andhaka-āṭṭhakathā, although almost always to reject its views,” K. R. Norman, *Pali Literature*, (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1983) 121. Further he discusses and puts forward his opinion that this rejection was not merely due to the content of the texts, but due to the language that they used: Dravadians, Ibid, 122.

The Kaṅkhāvitaranaṇavisuddhi-niddesa of the Vism contains a series of stanzas referring to the elders (porāṇās). Some stanzas among them are similar with the stanzas of the Karma Karmaphala Parīkṣā of the Mūlamadhyamaka Kārikā. For instance:

“Karma cen nāsti kartā ca kutaḥ syāt karmajam phalam, 

“Kammassa kārako natthi, vipākassa ca vedako

“Kammassa kārako natthi, vipākassa ca vedako

“Kammassa kārako natthi, vipākassa ca vedako

“Kammassa kārako natthi, vipākassa ca vedako

“Kammassa kārako natthi, vipākassa ca vedako

“Kammassa kārako natthi, vipākassa ca vedako

“Kammassa kārako natthi, vipākassa ca vedako

“Kammassa kārako natthi, vipākassa ca vedako

“In an etymological inquiry of the term Šāṅkha, Sanskrit English Dictionary discloses that it was based on numbers. Šāṅkha means ‘reckoning up’ or ‘enumerating.’, Monier Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, 4th ed. (New Delhi: Motilal Banarshidass Publishers, 2005) 1199. Because this teaching is utterly systematized on 25 true entities (tatvas), it is known to be a philosophy entitled by numbers or numerical system. The Šāṅkha philosophy comes to exist parallel to Yoga. Typically, the Šāṅkha is...
considered to be the philosophical part of Yoga, Brian Carr, & Indira Mahalingam, *Asian philosophy*. ed. (London: Routledge, 1997) 139. Companion Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy highlights only one significant difference between these two philosophies; one important difference is that Yoga is theistic whereas Sāṅkhya is atheistic. Ibid.

8In addition to normal perception, there is cognition of paranormal or extrasensory perception, as a valid means of knowledge, K. N. Jayathilake, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*. (London: Goerge Allen and Limited, 1963) 437.

9Along with perception, both normal and paranormal, seems to have gone inference (*anumāṇa*). Ibid, 441.

10Jayatilake points out; “The word ‘*anumāṇa*’ occurs apparently in the sense of ‘inference’ despite Mrs Rhys Davids’ statement that ‘*anumāṇa* apparently does not occur at all’ in the Piṭaka-s (v. ERE., Vol. 8, p. 133, fn. 4)”., Ibid, 441-442. Yet, further he explains referring the *Anumāṇa-sutta* too.


12“These inferences are made on the data of perception, normal and paranormal. What is considered to constitute knowledge are direct inferences made on the basis of the data of such perceptions. Ibid, 443.

13The remotest connection, natural or magical, between two things is sufficient for the Brahmanas to draw the analogy that ‘*A* is like *B*’ on the basis of which inferences are made. Ibid, 30. – Sometimes, Jain canonical texts signify that inference and analogy are in two different ways to obtain knowledge “The Sutras, however, regard *upamā* or comparison (analogy) as a means of knowledge different from inference. We have seen that the word *pramāṇa* was used in the sense of a ‘means of knowledge’ in the above quotation from the Uttaradhyayana Sutra” Ibid, 167.

14*Apicettha nāmaṃ nittejaṃ na sakena tejena pavattitum sakkoti…… nāmaṃ nissāya rūpaṃ pavattati, rūpaṃ nissaṃ nāmaṃ pavattati…… Imassa panatthassā vibhāvanatthāya imaṃ upamaṇudāharanti – yathā ca pīṭhasappīca*, Rhys Davids, 595.

Buddhaghosa was born in a small village. It was called ‘Ghosa’ because there were colossal sounds produced often by cowboys. His father’s name was Kesi. He was a chaplain of the king and had mastered the three Veda-s. Once, he came across a knotty statement in one of the Veda and was unable to solve it. At that time, Ghosa explored simply the knot that Kesi failed to comprehend.

Gray 47.

Henry Clarck Warren, Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosacarya, ed. (HOS,1989) X.

“Bandhupādāpaccā” is a considerable argument in this regard. But, it may not be an error made by him. He might have been forced by elders’ sources to provide this kind of definition. Also, the second argument, to me, is not stronger than the earlier one. “Brunahā” was defined by Buddhaghosa in a different way than the original form of Brahmin texts. I suppose that from a Buddhist perspective, the commentator has an authority to give different interpretations.


Here it should be remembered that the context in the two teachings are different. But the analogy is apparently the same; “curd can come out of milk, this is the limitation of causes.” Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, (University Press: Cambridge, 1922) 255. / “Or again, what is the principle that guides the transformations that take place in the atomic stage when one gross body, say milk, changes into curd, and so on? Sāṅkhya says that “as the total energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving, cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same ultimate Energy.” Ibid.254

Norman 110.
24Ibid.
25Carr & Mahalingam, 139.
26Ibid
27It is of considerable importance to remember that of the technical names of the six systems of philosophy, only two occur in the classical Upanishads, namely Sāṅkhya and Yoga or Sāṅkhya-yoga., F. Muller Max, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, (London: Longmans, 1899) 111.
28Jarl Charpentier, Uttaradhyayana, ed. (Upsala, 1922) chap. 12.
33Swami Virupakshananda VI.
36“Pakati kho esāti pakatikathā esā”. Moreover, it illustrates; “Athassa bhagavā taṃ pakativādam paṭikkhipitvā.” T. W. Rhys Davids, & J. E. Carpenter Dīghanikāya añṭhakathā (Sumāngalavilāsini). eds.vol. I-III. (London: Pali Text Society, 1968) 358. Thus, it is clear the commentator attests that the term ‘pakati’ comes in the Mahasihanada-sutta signifies a type of religious or philosophical system.

“pittasamuṭṭhānādisamaññā loka siddhā,” CSCD, S-ṭ (My. ed II) 361

“gahitavatthūsu vibhāgato gahanāṃ lokasiddhvādanti dassetun” CSCD, M-ṭ (My. ed II) 77

Taṃ pakativādam paṭikkhipitvāti yaṃ pubbe pākatikāṃ sāmaññāṃ, brahmaññāṅca hadaye ṭhapetvā tena acelakassapena “dukkāram sudukkāra”nti vuttāṃ, bhagavatā ca tameva sandhāya “pakati kho esā’’tīādi bhāsitaṃ CSCD, D-abhi-ṭ (My. ed II) 358.

A Loka Siddha or World Siddha is one, who has attained all yogic accomplishment, or power over human existence, both physical and psychical, and, as in this instance, is also an adept in the astrological sciences. W.Y. Evans-Wents, The Tibbeten Books of the Great Liberation (USA: Oxford University Press, 1954) 122.


nibbānaṃ na maññati, nibbānasmiṃ na maññati, nibbānato na maññati, nibbānaṃ meti na maññati, Trenckner 6.

Swami Virupakshananda stnz. 3.

P.V. Bapat, Vimuttīmagga and Visuddhimagga, (Poona:1937) LVIII.


Oskar von Hinuber, A Hand Book of Pali Literature (Walter de Gruyter: Berlin, 1996)126. / Norman has dated that it could be before fourth century A.D., See Norman 133.

Its importance lies in the fact that it was made use of by Buddhaghosa when he wrote the Visuddhimagga. Buddhaghosa does not quote the Vimuttīmagga by name, but the author of the ṭīkā upon the Visuddhimagga states that the word ekacce refers to the thera Upatissa who was responsible for proposing a refuted method of classifying temperaments in the Vimuttīmagga. Norman 113.
To illustrate the nature of Nāma and Rūpa, Upatissa has given here the simile of drum and sound, as well as that of a blind man and lame man. Bapat 113.

Noman 113. / M. Nangai, 71.

“The fourth of these early prose texts which were probably composed in North India is the Vimuttimagga, and as will be noted below there is some doubt as to whether this work is still extant.” Norman 113. / Bapat also makes an attempt to stress that this text was from India. Bapat LIV.

Rhys Davids 596.

von Hinuber 124.

ABBREVIATIONS

Vim Vimuttimagga
Vism Visuddhimagga

REFERENCES


