THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY OF MUSLIMS IN AMERICA AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

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Abstract

In this paper I attempt to analyze the construction of collective identity of Muslims in America since September 11th to answer two questions. How have the American Muslim movements emerged and developed after September 11? How do they construct their identities as Muslims in America? I will demonstrate the dynamic and linkages between the framing and constructing of collective identity of Muslims in America at three levels: public discourse; persuasive communication; and negotiations and consciousness raising during episodes of collective action. I will show how, for the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the America, the Internet and Friday sermons have become the major channels for constructing their collective identity, politics, and movements.

Introduction

The issue “collective identity” seems to have intrigued many scholars studying Muslims in several countries. (Bringa, 1995; Jacobson, 1998; Humphrey, 1998; and McGown, 1999). Yet, none of them focuses on the collective identity of American Muslims. The issue has now become especially important after the tragic event of September 11.

In this paper I attempt to analyze the construction of collective identity of Muslims in America since September 11th to answer two questions. How have the American Muslim movements emerged and developed after September 11? How do they construct their identities as Muslims in America?
I would argue that after the September 11th attacks, the collective identity of Muslims in America has formed through public discourse, persuasive communication, and negotiations in the politicization of everyday life. Not only did Muslims severely condemn the terrorists, but they also created their boundaries within peace discourse: reinterpreting the meaning of “Islam” and the concept of “Jihad” through various kinds of media. Finally, the political consciousness of Muslim identity as an Umma-Muslim community—has been raised through the Internet and Friday sermons, particularly with regard to the policies toward the conflicts between Israel and Palestine.

Methodology

There are several national Islamic organizations operating in North America today. Each Islamic organization has its own unique history, and their relevance to the lives of Muslim in America is great. They distribute information on Islam to politicians; organize prayer times; advocate on behalf of Muslim concerns; educate Muslim and non-Muslims about Islam; and publish books, pamphlets, and magazines that guide the faithful in their daily lives.

I rely on two key sources of data. First, websites of three Islamic organizations: The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA); The Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA); and Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR).

My second data source consists of Khutbahs or Friday sermons which are distributed weekly at the Muslim Association of Hawai‘i. According to Islamic teaching, Friday is the most prominent and the most virtuous of the days. Friday Prayer is obligatory upon every Muslim, except women, children, the sick, and travelers. A person who does not believe in the obligatory status of the Friday Prayer falls outside the pale of Islam, and one who abandons it due to negligence and careless, without a genuine reason, becomes a sinner. The sermon will be delivered before the Friday Prayer. The sermon in fact is meant to induce Muslims to offer devotions and worship to Allah, thus, when the preacher comes forward to deliver the sermon, then it is required for all Muslims not to engage in conversation.
I chose these three organizations because they are the three most distinctive national Islamic organizations in the United States, and I also attend and observe the Friday sermon regularly at the Muslim association of Hawai’i.

The website of these organizations and the Friday sermons are now becoming the public sphere of Muslim communities and play an important role in framing American Muslims’ identities post-September 11th. The Khutbah is an important “weekly dose” of Islam, and in fact for many it is the only Islamic contact they have in the entire week. The main purposes of the Khutbah is to remind people of their Islamic duties and to teach them about their religion.

Who are the Muslims in America?

According to the U.S. Department of State (2001), Islam is one of the fastest-growing religions in the United States. By the year 2010, America’s Muslim population is expected to surpass the Jewish population, making Islam the country’s second-largest faith after Christianity. (Webb, 1995; Power, 1998; Esposito, 2002; Nimer, 2002) While there are no official population figures of religious affiliation in the United States, and the estimates of the number of American Muslims vary from four to twelve million, it is safe to say that there are at least four to six million. According to the survey by Zogby International (2000), approximately a third of American Muslims live in the East Coast (39%), 27% in the Central/Great Lakes Region, 21% live in the South, and 13% in the West. The same survey indicated that the ethnic origins of American Muslims are as follow: 32% South Asia, 26% Middle East (Arab), 20% African American, 14% Other, 7% African, and 1% Not sure of ethnicity.

Muslims were present in America before the nineteenth century. The explorers, traders, and settlers who visited the new world from the time of Columbus include Muslims. In addition, between 14 percent and 20 percent of African slaves brought to America between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries were Muslims, although they were forced to convert to Christianity. Other Muslims, particularly Indians and Arabs,
who were not slaves also immigrated during this period and were able to maintain their spiritual, cultural, and social identity.

The numbers of Muslims in America increased in the late nineteenth century with the arrival of significant numbers of immigrants from the Arab world (Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan). Then, after World War II, significant numbers of immigrants from Palestine, who had lost their homes after the creation of Israel in 1948, and elites from the Middle East and South Asia, who sought either education or professional advancement, came to America. African-American Muslims originated with the nation of Islam in 1930.5

About two-thirds of the Muslims in America today are immigrants or descendants of immigrants. Like many other immigrants of diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds, Muslims have been challenged to define their place in American and European society. They struggle with the relationship of faith to national identity, intermarriage, gender relations, worship, and education. Many struggle with the English language, as well as their desire to hold on to their native or homeland cultures, and many face religious and ethnic discrimination in the workplace and society.

Living as a minority in a dominant culture that is often ignorant about Islam, many Muslims experience a sense of marginalization, alienation, and powerlessness. Some Muslims are further marked as “different” by their manner of dress, and they are sometimes singled out for harassment. This has increasingly been the case since September 11.6 Despite the fear and stress that Muslims suffered in the wake of the attacks, many Islamic organizations and leaders have worked actively to overcome the prejudice which come from either inside or outside Muslim communities.

**Collective Identity of Muslims in America**

“Identity” remains one of the most urgent - as well as hotly disputed - topics in sociology and cultural studies. For nearly two decades, it has been a central focus of debate for psychoanalytic, poststructuralist, and cultural materialist criticism in areas ranging from postcolonial and ethnic studies to feminism and queer theory. (Moya, 2000; Cerutti, 2001).

One of the most crucial elements in the history and development
of a social group is the maintenance of its identity. The identity question is central to the Muslim presence in the United States. American Muslims are experiencing both exhilaration at the opportunity to increase their numbers and develop their institutions and frustration and dismay as they continue to experience prejudice, intimidation, discrimination, misunderstanding, and even hatred. (Haddad, 1991). It is increasingly important, therefore, to take a fresh look at some of the ways in which they have constructed their collective identity and establishing an Islamic community in the United States especially after the September 11 attacks.

Bert Klandermans (1992) develops the concept of social construction of meaning in action situations. He refers to the processes of interpreting, defining, and consciousness raising that occurs among participants who interact during episodes of collective action. For Klandermans, an important aspect of the social construction is the construction of an injustice frame: situations are defined as unjust and grievances are transformed into demands. He proposes three levels of meaning construction:

1) the level of public discourse, at which collective identity is formed and transformed;
2) the level of persuasive communication conducted by movement organizations, their opponents, and countermovement organizations; or
3) the level of consciousness raising during episodes of collective action.

Alberto Melucci (1995) defines collective identity as a process of “constructing” an action system. For Melucci, collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups) and concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the action take place.

Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier (1992; 1995) have conceptualized collective identity as consisting of three interrelated processes: the construction of group boundaries that establish differences between a challenging group and dominant group; consciousness consists of the interpretive frameworks that emerge out of a challenging group’s struggle to define and realize its interests; and the negotiation or politicization of everyday life encompasses the symbols and everyday
actions subordinate groups use to resist and restructure existing systems of domination.

To many Muslims, the September 11th attacks also represented a major challenge in their struggle for acceptance as a community with a distinct religious identity. In that regard, Muslims in America have witnessed the good, the bad, and the ugly. ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ now became a major topic of public discourse in America.

The question is: how they create their boundaries, position themselves, or take actions in response to this public discourse? To this extent, Klandermans, Melucci and Taylor and Whittier’s works provide a good framework for understanding the process of the construction of Muslim identity in America.

Public Discourse on the Collective Identity of Muslims in America

Bert Klandermans (1992) suggests that media discourse has become a crucial element in this evolutionary process.

There is no doubt that whoever the terrorists were who attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon building on September 11, the attacks put all Muslims in a state of shock. All media attempted to relate the attacks to Islamic fundamentalism. As a Muslim, I still remember my triple suffering I experienced while watching the horrific events unfold on television. I first suffered at seeing the deaths of the innocent people in the World Trade Center who did not even have the opportunity to know why. Second, I suffered when I witnessed the television coverage of Muslim women in Palestine celebrating the attacks. Third, I was stunned when I opened my internet and found the hateful words directed at Muslims. I experienced all three events at the same time, and like many others around the country, I felt my heart sink, my throat tighten and my eyes fill with tears.

Along with major media organizations, mainline Protestants and Catholics as well as members from the Black, Latino, Asian, and Jewish communities have favored a position that distinguished between extremists and mainstream Muslims. On the other hand, some Christian conservatives and pro-Israel zealots have actively sought to drive a wedge between
Muslims and the nation. Members of these groups revived the defunct ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis and have actively worked for the exclusion of Muslims from public forums, while continuing to argue for anti-Muslim public policies.

These are just a few examples of why Muslims were disheartened by the vitriol from the far right wing and anti-Muslim elements.

At an annual gathering of the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) in June 2002 in St. Louis, the Rev. Jerry Vines, pastor of First Baptist Church of Jacksonville and a former SBC vice president, told SBC conventioneers that the Prophet Mohammad was a “demon-possessed pedophile.” Televangelist Pat Robertson, speaking on his Christian Broadcasting Network’s ‘700 Club’ program in February 2002, described a veritable infestation of America with violent, subversive Muslims. He chose to blast President George W. Bush’s position on Islam as well. He said “I have taken issue with our esteemed president in regard to his stand in saying Islam is a peaceful religion...It’s just not. And the Qur’an makes it very clear, if you see an infidel, you are to kill him.”

Repeatedly, evangelist Franklin Graham, son of the renowned Reverend Billy Graham, called the Islamic religion “wicked, violent and not of the same God.” He also said “I don’t believe this is a wonderful, peaceful religion...when you read the Qur’an and you read the verses from the Qur’an, it instructs the killing of the infidel, for those that are non-Muslim.”

To protect their collective identity, various Muslim groups and scholars responded to those public discourses. (CAIR, 2002). Muslims exposed the distortion of the Qur’an, which permits defensive struggles but calls for peace when aggression ends. On the issue of a Muslim’s friendship with people of other faiths, Muslims reminded the public by distributing news release that a number of verses support cordial relations with anyone who does not attack their faith. These include “O ye who believe! Take not for friends and protectors those who take your religion for a mockery or sport...” (Qur’an, 5: 57); “God only forbids you to make friendship with those who fought you on an account of your faith and drove you out of your homes and backed up others in your expulsion.” (Qur’an, 60:9).
Media Promotion of Tolerance

It is important to note the stark contrast between the anti-Muslim tone of several conservative media personalities and other reporters who took a more balanced approach in their coverage of September 11. Among the commentators who engaged in Muslim bashing were Sean Hannity and Bill O’Reilly of Fox News, Rich Lowry of the National Review, Dr. Laura Schlesinger, Rush Limbaugh, Cal Thomas, and Allen Keys. However, several media outlets have made an effort to draw a clear distinction between Islam and terrorism. They have also been vigilant on the issue of civil liberties. Here is an example:

* Oprah Winfrey Show, October 5, 2001

The one-hour, widely watched NBC program gave a crash course on Islam that was generally balanced. It introduced the main beliefs of Islam and featured an American Muslim couple practicing their faith and going about their daily lives in Chicago.

Most of the American public professed generally a negative impression of Muslims and Arabs in America shortly after the attacks. However, Muslims in America sympathized with some balancing views in the media. The most extensive post September 11th poll on Americans’ view on Islam, jointly sponsored by the ABC television network and the beliefnet religion news website, was conducted on January 6, 2002. The poll revealed that the percentage of Americans with a favorable view of Islam had dropped slightly, while the percentage with an unfavorable view of Islam had also dropped. (CAIR, 2002).

Americans Lend Hands to their Muslim Neighbors

There were several instances of Americans from various faith communities coming to the aid of Muslims in the wake of the violent post 9/11 backlash. Jennifer Schock, 31, a Web designer from Fairfax, Virginia, sprang into action upon learning that some American Muslim women started leaving their head scarves at home out of fear for their safety. Schock and other non-Muslim women around the USA began donning scarves...
themselves as a sign of solidarity with their Muslim sisters. Through the Internet, they established a global network called Scarves for Solidarity to support the right of Muslim women to choose their headwear without fearing retaliation.

Muslim community centers reported many spontaneous acts of kindness from members of the public. Within a week after the attacks, Islamic centers in San Diego received bouquets of flower and cards of support and sympathy from members of other faith groups—specially after reports of Muslim women being afraid to leave home.

One measure of this support is surveys targeting Muslim community members. In an August 2002 CAIR survey, about 80 percent of 945 respondents said they have experienced kindness or support from friends or colleagues of other faiths. (In contrast, 57 percent said they have experienced anti-Muslim bias or discrimination).

According to Taylor and Whittier (1992; 1995), boundaries mark the social territories of group relations by highlighting differences between activists and the web of others in the contested social world. I find that Muslims in America use public discourse as constructing their boundary of asserting “who we are.” Boundary markers are, therefore, central to promote a heightened collective identity of Muslims in America and to frame interaction between members of the in-group members and the out-group members.

**Persuasive Communication**

The social construction of protest proceeds in the context of mobilization and counter mobilization campaigns, as different actors in social conflict try to persuade individual citizens to take their side. According to Bert Klandermans (1997: 89), unlike public discourse and the process through which collective identities are formed and transformed, the construction of meaning at this level involves deliberate attempts to influence beliefs. Movement organizations, opponents, and countermovement organizations alike try to convince the individual that they are right. Organizers are “social reconstructionists,” they construct an alternative
view of social reality.

Within hours of the first plane hitting the World Trade Center on September 11, American Muslim organizations issued a joint statement condemning the terrorist attacks, including the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), and Muslim American Society (MSA). The statement read in part:

American Muslims utterly condemn what are vicious and cowardly acts of terrorism against innocent civilians. We join with all Americans in calling for the swift apprehension and punishment of the perpetrators. No political cause could ever be assisted by such immoral acts. (CAIR, 2002).

Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) sponsored a full-page advertisement in the Washington Post on September 16, 2001, condemning the attacks and expressing gratitude to the rescue workers and condolences to the families of the victims.

Islamic organizations and leaders then reached out to other faith communities to condemn terrorism in solidarity with one another, together with other major Christian groups such as the National Conference of Catholic Bishops.

The statements from notable scholars making clear the distinction between Islam and terrorism flow out via the Internet. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the most respected leaders of Sunni Islam, denounced the attacks against civilians and encouraged Muslims to donate blood to the victims of the attack. He issued a statement saying that “Our hearts bleed for the attacks that have targeted the World Trade Center, as well as other institutions in the United States despite our strong positions to the American biased policy towards Israel on the military, political, and economic fronts. Islam is the religion of tolerance, holds the human soul in high esteem, and considers the attack against innocent human beings a great sin.” This is backed by the Qur’an verse which reads:

who so ever kills a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as if he has killed all mankind, and who so ever saves the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind.'
(Qur’an, 5: 32).

After September 11 attacks, Islamic leaders of every organization promptly reconstruct the meaning of “Islam” to distinguish themselves from terrorists. They actively readdress the “peace discourse” in Islam as a distinctive concept of Muslim identity. We can find statements and articles about “peace discourse” on the Internet and also the Friday sermons. For examples, Hakim Quansafi, president of the Muslim Association of Hawai‘i, preaches at the Friday sermon, and news release at the website that “Islam is a continuation of all the morals of all the religions. It is a religion of the prophet Abraham and all the prophets, which means submission to God. Islam means peace. We the Muslims in Hawai‘i condemn in the strongest possible terms what are apparently vicious and cowardly acts of terrorism against innocent civilians. We offer our condolences and prayers to the victims and their families for this horrific tragedy.”¹¹

Maulana Wahidulddin Khan, a distinctive Muslim scholar, states in an Islamic website that “Islam is a religion which teaches non-violence. According to the Qu’ran, God does not love ‘Fasad’ or violence or terrorism. On the other hand, non-violence should never be confused with inaction or passivity. Non-violence is an action in the full sense of the word. Rather it is more forceful an action than that of violence. It is the fact that non-violent activism is more powerful and effective than violent activism.”¹²

All websites reconstruct the concept of “jihad” which is always misunderstood in the public discourse. They try to argue that “jihad” is one of the most misunderstood and abused aspects of Islam. There are some Muslims who exploit and misuse this concept for their own political objectives. There are many non-Muslims who misunderstand it or use it to discredit Islam and Muslims.¹³

The Arabic term “jihad” usually translates into European languages as “holy war,” more on the basis of its juridical usage in Islam than on its much more universal meaning in the Qur’an and Hadith, which is derived from the root ‘johh’ whose primary meaning is to strive or to exert oneself. Jihad means serious and sincere struggle on the personal as well as the social level. It refers to struggles to do good and to remove injustice,
oppression and evil from society. This struggle should be spiritual as well as social, economic and political.

The events of September 11 were followed by a surge of public interest in Islam and Muslims. Ordinary people wanted to know what Muslims thought of the attacks; others began wondering about the intentions of Muslims in their midst. Muslims in America quickly realized that the best way to allay fear, prevent further damage to America’s well being, and preserve the society’s unity was to reach out to their neighbors to an unprecedented degree. The American Muslims outreach to the rest of the country has been noteworthy for its unusual degree of openness, observed the Los Angeles Times on September 30, 2001. Mosques opened their doors, Muslims conducted educational programs and Islamic organizations and centers launched media and advertising campaigns to communicate with their fellow Americans.

According to Melucci (1995), collective identity is a process referring to a network of active relationships between actors, who interact, communicate, influence each other, negotiate, and make decisions. During this process, we have seen the model of leadership, communicative channels, and technologies of communication which constitute parts of this network of relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in America.

**Negotiations and Consciousness-Raising during Episodes of Collective Action**

Bert Klandermans (1992: 93) suggests that once individuals become involved in an episode of collective action their view of the world may change dramatically. They acquire new collective identities as participants in collective action. These new identities, however, do not necessarily represent a disjunction with the past, since they evolve from beliefs an individual already shared with the collective.

Observing the Friday sermons and e-mail released to Muslims in America, I find that Muslims’ consciousness has been raised during the episode of collective actions.

Not only do they criticize the terrorists attacks, but also criticize American companies supporting Israeli government in killing Palestinian
people. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, again, issued a decree during his Khutbah that consuming goods from American companies is forbidden for Muslims because those companies support Israel through the U.S. government.

On delivering a Friday sermon, Hakim Quansafi, the president of Hawaii Muslim Association, addressed Muslims in Hawai‘i that according to CIA report, Muslims are the heaviest smokers of the world, and each year cigarettes contribute $400 million dollars in taxes which in turn goes to support Israeli militarism. So, Muslims who smoke are supporting Israel to kill innocent people in Palestine. And on March 2002, the association also conducted a peace rally for Palestinian peoples in front of the state capital of Hawai‘i.

Moreover, ‘American Muslims for Global Peace and Justice’ delivered an article, “Global Action Alert #1 Boycott Starbucks: You might save a life In Palestine,” to all American Muslim organizations. The message states that:

For American Muslim point of view, despite the current onslaught undertaken by Israel against the Palestinian people, Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz is fueling an already tense situation by using inflamed language to “legitimate” Israel’s actions. American Muslims for Global Peace and Justice (Global Peace) calls on all Muslims and all people of conscience to boycott the Starbucks Coffee Company regarding Starbucks also plans on opening several shops in Israel, which amounts to the funding of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian people in much the same way that U.S. tax dollars sent to Israel help fund the armory used to kill and besiege Palestinians.

The website called on Muslims to take action world wide to refuse to support Starbucks’ stance by not buying their products.

Tell Schultz and his company that you will not support such insightful remarks at a time when people are being killed on a daily basis as a result of the ongoing aggression by the Israeli army. Starbucks has over 3,000 stores worldwide, so we are calling on Muslims to take up this boycott in every city, in every neighborhood where Starbucks operates. We ask that
this Action Alert be translated into other languages and distributed in
countries worldwide. Stop drinking Starbucks coffee, and make sure you
tell them why you have stopped.

According to Taylor and Whittier’s (1992; 1995) concept of
negotiation or politicization of everyday life, the action alert in refusing
to support Starbucks on Muslims’ websites, or the calling on Friday sermon
to stop smoking are a type of negotiation central to the construction of
politicized collective identity of Muslims in America. It calls attention to
self-transformation which aims primarily at the individual level, and
renegotiates the meaning of “Muslim” as an antagonist to the dominant
power.

Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted to illustrate the social construction
of Muslim identities in America in the aftermath of September 11. According
to the data from the websites of a few national Islamic organizations in
America and Friday sermons, we have seen the dynamic and linkages
between the framing and constructing of collective identity of Muslims in
America at three levels: public discourse; persuasive communication; and
negotiations and consciousness raising during episodes of collective action.

In the public discourse, for the most part, American media coverage
of Muslims and events in the Muslim world concentrates on the sensational.
Greg Noakes (1998), in “Muslim and the American Press” maintains that
the media propensity for the ‘sensational,” the explosive of headline events,
acts of violence, a religious extremism capture the headlines at the expense
of the faith and practice of vast majority of Muslims. Undoubtedly, the
failures or limitations of American media reporting on Islam and Muslims
have an impact on the sensibilities and sensitivities of Muslim in America,
especially in the aftermath of September 11 attacks. This level is important
as a starting point for constructing collective action among Muslims in
America.

To this extent, we have seen the persuasive communication level.
All Muslim organizations in America redefine the meaning of “Islam” and
“jihad” to “peace discourse,” to distinguish themselves from the terrorists and open their communities to the public.

Finally, the consciousness of Muslim’s Umma (unity) has been raised, and takes peaceful action against American companies which support Israel in killing Palestinians, and finally, these organizations have gradually become a part of anti-war movement in America.

To Muslims in America, the September 11 attacks represented a major challenge in their struggle for acceptance as a community with a distinct religious identity. Interestingly, the Friday sermon and the Internet have hence become a dominant force both in terms of how they represent themselves and how the ‘other’ is represented to them. And how do other aspects of identity influence the term of religious discourse on the Internet? There are also those who argue that the Internet has had a moderating effect on Islamist discourse. Sa’ud al-Faqih, for example, believes that Internet website, chat-rooms, and discussion forums devoted the debate concerning Islam and politics serve to encourage greater tolerance. He believes that in these new arenas, one sees a greater convergence in the center of Islamists’ political spectrum and a weakening of the extremes. (Mandaville, Peter, 2001). Thus for the overwhelming majority of Muslims in America, the Internet and Friday sermons are major channels for constructing their collective identity, politics, and movements within Islam.
ENDNOTES

1 ISNA is the most well-known Muslim organization. It acts as an umbrella group for many local mosques and associations.

2 ICNA is an offshoot of ISNA founded by immigrants from the Indian subcontinent. It has chapters in many major cities and engages in charity work and missionary efforts.

3 CAIR Muslim public affairs organization that work to confront discrimination, influence politics, and educate people about Islam.

4 see a collection of essays and research findings on the emerging Muslim communities in the United States of America in Sulayman Nyang (1999).


6 The report on one year after 9-11 by CAIR insists that the 9-11 attacks were followed by a dramatic rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes. CAIR received 1,717 reports of harassment, violence and other discriminatory acts in the first six months.

7 I knew later that the picture was another event during the gulf war on 1992.

8 Website: http://www.cbn.com.

9 Website: http://www.interfaithpeace.org.

10 Website: http://www.iio.org/.


14 Friday sermon at the Islamic Center of Hawai’i, 25 January 2002.

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